I reached out to an authoritative source in the know to see if these claims hold any water, and the prompt reply was that these are, in fact, fake news.

I’ll also share a few tips on how to identify fake China news.

The claim went something like this:

According to this X post from @hormuzletter:

BREAKING: In a direct message to the Trump administration and the US Navy, China’s Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun says Chinese ships will continue transiting the Strait of Hormuz through agreements with Iran, and warns the US not to “meddle in our affairs.”

Also from Dong’s statement:

1. Says Chinese ships are currently “moving in and out of the waters of the Strait of Hormuz”

2. Confirms China has existing “trade and energy agreements with Iran” that China will “respect and honor”

3. Explicitly states: “Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz and it is open for us,” recognizing Iranian sovereignty over transit

In another similar post, @En_chinaNews says

CHINA BACKS IRAN

“We are commited for peace & stability in the world. We are monitoring the situation in the middle east. Our ships are moving in and out of the waters of Strait of Hormuz. We have trade & energy agreements with Iran. We will respect & honour them and expect others to not meddle in our affairs. Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz and it is open for us.”- China’s Minister of Defence Admiral Dong Jun

There are many others who recycled this claim, and I can’t provide an exhaustive list of all of them. Together, these posts have garnered millions of views, and what’s more worrying is that there’s evidence that they’ve been picked up by AI as good information sources, as shown in the screenshot below.

All of the above are fake. Unfortunately, these posts have misled many web users, including China hands.

While I agree that there is a responsibility for official Chinese sources to timely identify and debunk China-related fake news, there are actually a few telltale signs that these posts are fake.

First, see if this information comes from official Chinese sources. Official Chinese news and statements always come from an official source, such as a government website/Wechat account, or official news outlets, such as Xinhua/CMG/People’s Daily etc. If the information cannot be found among those sources, take it with a pinch of salt.

Second, the Chinese official language is uniquely styled, and these posts’ language style is very different from the official Chinese language style.

Third, China has always been very diplomatic in dealing with other countries and is not in the habit of issuing explicit stern warnings, especially publicly. China considers its relations with the U.S. to be one of the most consequential, and therefore is even less likely to be “telling the U.S. off“ in such a manner.

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“They called it the flower that changed the whole world.”

The phrase appeared beneath a photograph on the social-media page of a local newspaper in Bor, a small mining town in eastern Serbia. The image showed a modest garden of red tulips in bloom, improbably set against the steel-gray outlines of a copper smelter. It was early 2024, and over dinner that evening, Guozhu Qiu—then in his late forties—slid his phone across the table so I could see it for myself.

Bor has lived with mines for more than a century. Since 1904, when a French company first began extracting copper from the surrounding hills, mining has defined the town’s economy and its identity. Generations of families earned their livelihoods underground or beside open pits. Flowers were not part of the local imagination; barren slopes, tailings ponds, and industrial dust were. After the Kosovo War, several Western companies acquired major mining assets in the area. They invested little in modernization, focusing instead on extracting near-surface ore. When those deposits were exhausted, the mines were abandoned. By the early 2000s, Bor was left with scarred land and widespread unemployment.

What followed, according to local media, was a revival—sometimes described as “reindustrialization”—driven by Chinese investment and technology. Qiu had arrived as chief executive of Zijin Copper Bor under a cloud of skepticism. From the first day, he was met with protests and warnings. Environmental groups predicted disaster; residents feared more pollution, more neglect, more broken promises.

“It was a difficult time,” Qiu told me. Western media attention was intense, and every operational decision was scrutinized. He explained that his team followed the same standards applied in modern Chinese mining projects, where environmental protection is treated not as an afterthought, but as a design principle. Sustainability, he insisted, was built into the process from the beginning.

I am not a mining expert, and terms like closed-loop water recycling, high-standard tailings management, real-time environmental monitoring, and low-emission smelting meant little to me in practice. What I could understand was Qiu’s symbolic gesture: planting a tulip garden just twenty meters from the smelting plant. The flowers, he said, were meant to demonstrate confidence in the technology—to show that the air, water, and soil were safe enough for life to flourish.

According to Serbian regulators, the project meets—and in some cases exceeds—both national and European Union environmental standards. Local rivers and farmland have been protected, while abandoned slopes are being restored with new vegetation. The mine has also brought back jobs, upgraded infrastructure, and funded community projects. “Before,” a local journalist told me, “Young women wanted to marry someone in Belgrade.” Now, many choose to stay.

The next morning, Qiu took me to the garden. New tulips had been planted, in rows of yellow, white, and purple. Forklifts carrying copper plates moved steadily between the factory and the warehouse, passing the flowers on each trip. Across the road, hills once stripped bare were slowly turning green again.

I asked Qiu whether mines in China looked like this. He smiled and shook his head. “Many mines in China are already very green,” he said. “That just means we can do even more here—and we will.”

Similar scenes are unfolding far beyond Serbia.

On the northern coast of Central Java, in Indonesia’s Kendal industrial zone, stands a factory that defies many of the clichés attached to foreign investment. Operated by a joint venture led by Trina Solar, it produces solar cells and panels—the quiet infrastructure of an energy transition that rarely announces itself with spectacle.

The complex is orderly rather than imposing. Greenery lines the perimeter; drainage channels are clear; there is no visible haze above the rooftops. For nearby residents, the most noticeable change has not been noise or pollution, but steady employment and the gradual improvement of local roads and services.

Inside, advanced production lines recycle water in closed loops and minimize chemical discharge. These choices are driven partly by efficiency, partly by regulation. Indonesian environmental standards apply, and company managers emphasize that compliance is deliberate, not reluctant. The factory sits among villages, farms, and fishing communities. Many of the workers grew up nearby. They commute short distances, receive technical training, and return home to neighborhoods that remain green and livable. For them, the factory has not replaced the landscape; it has become part of it.

What these places suggest—quietly, without slogans—is that industrial development need not arrive as a rupture. In Kendal, as in Bor, Chinese investment has aligned itself with local development goals while leaving air breathable, water usable, and communities intact. The products made there will travel far. The benefits, for now, remain close to home.

It is against this backdrop that I often feel a sense of dissonance when reading Western media coverage of Chinese companies. The narrative is familiar: factories built with little regard for the environment, labor practices that disregard human rights, supply chains allegedly linked to forced labor. The tone is confident, even moralistic. Yet it bears little resemblance to what I have seen.

The reality is more complicated. Chinese companies operating overseas are acutely aware that a single mistake can be amplified into a judgment on the entire country. As a result, many export not only capital, but also advanced environmental technologies developed at home. They are often eager—sometimes anxious—to prove their commitment to green development, knowing that reputational damage travels faster than any shipment of goods.

Their approach to human rights tends to place development at the center. Jobs, infrastructure, technology, and income matter, especially in places long excluded from the benefits of industrialization. In many cases, corporate standards meet or exceed those in Europe and the United States—not because they are forced to, but because falling short has become untenable.

Why, then, the persistent accusations? Part of the answer lies in economic interest. Western companies were the first to industrialize in the developing world, often leaving behind pollution and unresolved social harm. When they prospered, they rarely repaired the damage. Instead, they helped establish increasingly high thresholds for entry—some necessary, others conveniently restrictive. As Chinese firms reach and sometimes surpass these standards, exclusion becomes harder. What remains is narrative warfare: allegations and campaigns that slow projects through public pressure rather than regulation. For host countries, this is not protection—it is paralysis.

There is also the matter of scrutiny. Chinese companies are examined under a magnifying glass. Routine problems—temporary road closures, maintenance disruptions, construction delays—are framed as evidence of systemic failure. What would be considered ordinary elsewhere becomes, in this context, a question of national character.

Finally, geopolitics intrudes. Strategic competition seeps into factory floors and construction sites. Investment is reframed as “new colonialism,” and cooperation as a hidden agenda. These terms travel easily across headlines, even when they obscure more than they reveal. They say less about the factories themselves than about a world struggling to adjust to shifting economic power.

The factories, meanwhile, continue operating. Workers clock in and out. Air and water are tested. Hillsides turn green. What lingers above them is not smoke, but suspicion—often manufactured far from the places it claims to defend.

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In 2017, at the foot of a dormant Pacific volcano on Rarotonga, I met Colin Rattle, a 72-year-old jeweller in the Cook Islands. He was a quiet, reclusive craftsman who spent his days shaping black pearls in a small studio away from the tourist trails. As he spoke, my eyes drifted to a cardboard box perched high on a shelf.

On its side were Chinese characters and the name “ChinaTrans,” a logistics company. Rattle explained that he had ordered precision drills, the kind needed to bore clean holes through black pearls, from a Chinese online marketplace. The tools arrived straight to his workshop from a factory near Shanghai, shipping included.

Not long before, sourcing something that specific meant a five-hour flight to Auckland, with no guarantee of finding the right item and at a much higher cost. Ordering from China was not merely cheaper. It changed what was feasible. For the first time in decades, geography no longer set the outer boundary of his craft.

China entered Rattle’s life in the most ordinary way, not as a factory floor or a macroeconomic statistic, but as a digital supply chain that made a small business easier to sustain. This was globalization at its most mundane and at its most useful.

For years, that was how free trade was typically understood: as a broadly positive force, with manageable side effects. After 2018, the mood shifted. What had once been described as efficiency and integration was increasingly recast as vulnerability and threat. The phrase “China shock,” which had faded from public debate, returned with new urgency.

“China Shock 1.0” was the argument that low-cost Chinese imports helped hollow out parts of American manufacturing. “China Shock 2.0” extends the claim beyond the West, warning that China’s industrial scale and export push are now distorting markets across the developing world.

The “China Shock” story often starts from a simple picture: China sells more goods abroad, developing countries suffer, and the world needs to push back. That picture is emotionally intuitive, but it can be analytically misleading. A more careful reading of the evidence suggests three corrections.

First, rising export value is not the same thing as “more stuff flooding markets.” Part of what looks like an export surge is a shift in what China sells, and how much value is embedded in those products. Over the past decade and a half, China’s export structure has moved away from the older model of assembling imported parts for re-export and toward producing a larger share of the value at home. One way to see this is the domestic value added in exports. A Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions analysis finds that China’s domestic value-added share in exports rose from 66 percent in 2007 to 76 percent in 2020, driven in large part by a decline in “processing trade,” the classic assembly-for-export model.

That matters because it changes what “more exports” actually means. When a country’s export value rises because it is exporting higher-value products, better components, more machinery, and more advanced systems, the appropriate question is not just who loses market share in a narrow sense, but also who gains from cheaper and better capital goods and from faster technology diffusion.

Nowhere is this clearer than in clean-energy supply chains. The International Energy Agency notes bluntly that China has been instrumental in bringing down costs worldwide for solar PV, with “multiple benefits” for clean energy transitions. Lower prices for solar panels and related equipment are not a side detail for developing countries. For many of them, energy is a binding constraint on growth and fiscal stability. A fall in the price of key energy technologies is a real economic benefit, even if it also forces painful adjustments in some manufacturing niches.

Second, the “victim” framing often ignores how trade works in supply-chain economies. Many developing countries import a great deal from China precisely because those imports allow them to export more. The key point is that in modern production networks, imports are frequently inputs, not just consumer goods that displace local firms. A World Bank “Taking Stock” report on Vietnam makes this logic explicit: Vietnam’s imports of intermediate goods are “highly correlated” with its exports, so when exports slow, imports of intermediates slow too.

Vietnam is a particularly useful example because it is frequently cited in Western debates as being squeezed by China while also being a major beneficiary of supply-chain reconfiguration. Yet the trade data show a country expanding on both sides of its trade account. Reuters reports that Vietnam’s exports rose 14.3 percent in 2024 to $405.53 billion, while imports rose 16.7 percent to $380.76 billion, still leaving a substantial trade surplus. The story here is not “China sells, Vietnam loses.” It is that Vietnam’s export platform depends on imported machinery and intermediate inputs, including from China, and that relationship can push both imports and exports higher at the same time.

This is the broader point: when commentators point to gross import numbers and declare “harm,” they often skip the crucial step of asking what those imports are for. If imported components, equipment, and materials are feeding export growth, then a simple “net victim” label becomes much harder to defend. Even where bilateral imbalances exist, gross flows alone do not tell you how much domestic value is being created, how many jobs are supported, or whether the importing economy is becoming more competitive over time.

Third, much of the loudest “Second China Shock” rhetoric is concentrated in Western debates, while many developing countries behave less like helpless victims and more like governments managing interdependence. That does not mean there are no frictions, no lobbying by domestic industries, and no trade remedies. It means that their revealed preferences do not look like a blanket rejection of economic ties with China.

One revealing signal is institutional: rather than disengaging, many developing-country blocs continue to deepen economic arrangements with China, including in newer areas such as digital trade, green economy cooperation, and supply-chain connectivity. Reuters reports that China and ASEAN completed negotiations on an upgraded version of their free trade agreement, “FTA 3.0,” expanding cooperation in precisely these forward-looking domains; Reuters also notes that ASEAN is China’s largest trading partner, and provides the scale of that relationship. That is not what a region does if it believes it is structurally losing with no offsetting gains.

A careful way to put the agency point is this: developing countries have their own commercial interests, domestic coalitions, and industrial strategies. If the dominant reality were one-sided harm from Chinese exports, the expectation would be broad and sustained alignment among these countries against China in trade diplomacy, and a turn toward systematic decoupling. Instead, what often appears is something more pragmatic: selective defensiveness in specific sectors combined with continued participation in China-centered supply chains and continued efforts to bargain for better terms. That is consistent with countries weighing costs and benefits, not with them being passive casualties in someone else’s moral narrative.

A rebuttal does not need to deny that Chinese competition can create adjustment pains. It should insist on getting the mechanism right. Some of what looks like an export wave is export upgrading and a higher domestic value-added share, not simply “more volume.” Many developing countries’ imports from China are a feature of their own export growth model, not a sign of economic helplessness. And the way these countries act in policy, trade negotiations, and supply-chain strategy suggests that they do not see themselves as straightforward losers.

If the “Second China Shock” claim is that China’s exports are broadly and systematically damaging developing countries, the burden is to show, with careful value-added and sector-level evidence, that the harms dominate the gains across a wide range of economies, not just in select industries, and not just through gross trade numbers. Without that, the story risks becoming a Western political economy narrative projected outward, rather than an empirically grounded account of how developing countries are actually experiencing China’s rise.

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Due to seismic demographic and economic shifts in Chinese society over the past few decades, the hukou system has been loosening its grip, according to a new study by two economists based on a quantitative analysis of reforms between 1996 and 2024.

Key finding

The study finds that the overall “hukou threshold” across 332 Chinese cities has fallen to 12.6 percent, down from 98.8 percent in 1999. In other words, on average, Chinese cities now block just over one-tenth of would-be hukou holders from obtaining local registration. This suggests that Chinese people are freer than ever to move around the country for work or other purposes, and that the ongoing erosion of hukou barriers is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.

This newsletter is based on an interview by Southern Weekly, which also made the charts in this newsletter. Original interview here.

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Breakdown

The study was conducted by Zhang Jipeng, an economics professor at Shandong University, and Chen Zhu, a PhD candidate at the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics. Their paper, titled 《户籍制度改革与城市落户门槛的量化分析：1996-2024》, was published in 2024.

The authors collected hukou registration regulations from 332 Chinese cities, including centrally administered municipalities and prefecture-level municipalities, leaving out only a handful of cities that had no clear and publicly available rules on hukou registration. (Not sure what centrally administered municipalities and prefecture-level municipalities are? See this explainer by David Fishman.)

The study focuses on people aged 15 to 64 whose reason for relocating was work, starting a business, or moving as a result of the rezoning of their original place of residence.

The study measures hukou stringency using a “threshold level,” defined as the difficulty of obtaining local hukou in a given city. More specifically, the researchers calculate the ratio of people eligible for a city’s hukou to all non-hukou residents in that city, and then subtract that ratio from 100 percent.

For example, if City A has 1 million non-hukou residents and 600,000 of them are eligible for local hukou, then the hukou threshold for the city is 100% − 600,000/1,000,000 = 40%.

The study categorizes Chinese cities into six tiers and finds that the lower the city tier, the lower its hukou threshold and the faster that threshold has fallen.

At present, 92.77 percent of cities have thresholds below 20 percent, and 48.9 percent of all cities have no threshold at all. Fourth- and fifth-tier cities now have essentially no thresholds. On average, fifth-tier cities have a hukou threshold of just 1.27 percent. In 17 provinces, all cities have thresholds below 20 percent.

Only nine cities still have a hukou threshold above 50 percent. They are the centrally administered municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, as well as the economically developed cities of Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Xiamen, Suzhou, Hangzhou, and Zhongshan.

The study finds that the key driver of the decline in thresholds is top-down policy. Thresholds fell rapidly after two central-level policy initiatives in 2001 and 2014, especially after 2014.

Note: here, yours truly will just add a bit of context for Hukou reforms in China. China adopted a rigid Hukou system before 1978, creating a huge barrier between urban and rural populations. Since market reforms began in 1978, hukou regulations loosened to allow more farmers to settle in cities to satisfy the demand for labor there. Entering the 2010s, Hukou reform started to be considered a tool to promote fairness in society and the balance of development, as it gave people more freedom to relocate to cities that provided better public goods. This mindset is consistently embodied in major top-level policy papers, including the Proposal for the 15th Five-Year Plan that was released in October.

From 1999 to 2003, average hukou thresholds fell from 98.8 percent to 69 percent, then to 30.5 percent in 2016, and further to 12.6 percent in 2024. As the chart above indicates, however, different cities have reduced their thresholds at very different speeds.

Beyond top-level directives, cities themselves also have strong incentives to lower thresholds. Several types of cities are especially eager to relax their rules:

· Cities with more vibrant manufacturing sectors and stronger demand for labor
· Cities with more severe population aging
· Cities facing more intense competition from neighboring cities
· Cities with sluggish real-estate markets
· Cities located close to top-tier metropolises

What happens next, especially in major cities?

Zhang expects thresholds to keep falling, albeit at a slower pace, and to move down in small steps rather than through one sweeping reform. Possible measures include expanding hukou quota programs, lowering eligibility criteria, or first allowing hukou registration in suburban areas.

Does all of this mean the hukou system is becoming irrelevant?

Yes and no, according to the study.

Yes, it is now much easier to obtain hukou in the vast majority of cities. But no, because many government-provided services are still tied to hukou status. In other words, while it is no longer very difficult to change your hukou, it remains a necessary step to access many public goods.

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The statement in full is posted below, but first, the TLDR version.

1. China’s actions with regard to RE export control is in accordance with Chinese laws, and follow a consistent policy of preventing RE from being used in military buildups that can undermine peace and stability.

2. China notified relevant countries before announcing the latest RE export control so Before announcing the measures, so any claims that China acted in “surprise“ are unsubstantiated.

3. Export control is not an Export ban. China will continue to actively evaluate export requests to satisfy legitimate uses of China’s RE.

4. Even after the trade talks between China and the U.S. in Madrid, Washington has imposed a series of restrictive measures against China, which should be viewed as the backdrop of China’s latest move on RE.

5. The decision to impose fees on U.S. vessels in Chinese seaports is in direct response to a USTR decision in April. The U.S. refused to walk back the decision despite repeated constructive attempts by Beijing to resolve the issue, forcing Beijing to impose a countermeasure.

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Full Mofcom statement:

MOFCOM Spokesperson’s Remarks on China’s Recent Economic and Trade Policies and Measures

1. Q: On October 9, the Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs published an announcement on imposing export control measures on related rare earth items. What are China’s considerations behind this?

A: China’s announcement of export control measures on rare earths and related items is a legitimate action by the Chinese government to refine its export control system in accordance with laws and regulations. In the context of turmoil and frequent military conflicts in the world, China has taken note of the important uses of medium and heavy rare earths and related items in the military field. China, as a responsible major country, employs export controls on related items according to the law, in order to better defend world peace and regional stability, and to fulfill non-proliferation and other international obligations.

China’s export controls are not export bans. Licenses will be granted for eligible applications. Before the measures were announced, China had already notified relevant countries and regions through bilateral export control dialogue mechanisms. China stands ready to work with the rest of the world to step up export control dialogue and exchange, so as to better safeguard the security and stability of global industrial and supply chains.

2. Q: We have noted that recently the Ministry of Commerce has issued an announcement strengthening export controls on rare earths and related items. Could you please introduce the follow-up measures of implementation?

A: As a responsible major country, China always firmly safeguards its national security and international common security, always takes a just and reasonable principled position and implements export control measures in a prudential and moderate manner. China had made thorough assessment of the measures’ possible impact on industrial and supply chains in advance and is certain that related impact is very limited. Before announcing the measures, China had notified relevant countries and regions through bilateral export control dialogue mechanisms.

Going forward, the Chinese government will conduct reviews in accordance with laws and regulations, grant licenses to eligible applications, as well as actively considering the applicability of facilitation measures such as general licenses and license exemptions to effectively promote legitimate trade. I want to emphasize that China’s export controls are not export bans. All applications of compliant export for civil use can get approval, so that relevant businesses have no need to worry. The Chinese government will work with all countries as always, to firmly safeguard world peace and stability in neighboring regions, and jointly maintain the stability of global industrial and supply chains.

3. Q: On October 10 EST, the U.S. announced that, in response to China’s export control on rare earths and related items, the U.S. will impose a tariff of 100% on China, and impose export control on all critical software. What are MOFCOM’s comments on this?

A: China has taken note of the situation. On October 9, China released export control measures on rare earths and related items, which are normal actions taken by the Chinese government in accordance with laws and regulations to refine its own export control system. As a responsible major country, China always firmly safeguards its national security and international common security, always takes a just and reasonable principled position and implements export control measures in a prudential and moderate manner. The U.S. remarks reflect textbook “double standard”. For a long time, the U.S. has been overstretching the concept of national security, abusing export control, taking discriminatory actions against China, and imposing unilateral long-arm jurisdiction measures on various products including semiconductor equipment and chips. The U.S. Commerce Control List (CCL) covers over 3000 items, whereas China’s Export Control List of Dual-use Items only cover about 900. The U.S. has long imposed the ‘de minimis’ rule for export controls, with a lowest threshold of 0%. These measures of U.S. side have seriously harmed the legitimate and lawful rights and interests of companies, severely disrupted the international economic and trade order, and gravely undermined the security and stability of global industrial and supply chains.

Particularly since the China-U.S. economic and trade talks in Madrid in September, the U.S., in just 20 days, has introduced a string of new restrictive measures targeting China. It has put multiple Chinese entities on the Entity List and Special Designated National List; arbitrarily expanded the scope of control over businesses with the Affiliates Rule that affects thousands of Chinese companies; and persisted with the implementation of Section 301 measures targeting China’s maritime, logistics and shipbuilding industries in disregard of China’s concerns and goodwill. The U.S. actions have severely harmed China’s interests and undermined the atmosphere of bilateral economic and trade talks, and China is resolutely opposed to them.

Willful threats of high tariffs are not the right way to get along with China. China’s position on the trade war is consistent: we do not want it, but we are not afraid of it. China urges the U.S. to promptly correct its wrong practices, adhere to the important consensuses of the phone calls between the two heads of state, protect the hard-won outcomes of consultations, continue to use the China-U.S. economic and trade consultation mechanism, and address respective concerns and properly manage differences through dialogues and on the basis of mutual respect and equal-footed consultation, so as to ensure the stable, sound and sustainable development of the China-U.S. economic and trade relationship. If the U.S. insists on going the wrong way, China will surely take resolute measures to protect its legitimate rights and interests.

4. Q: The U.S. will impose port fees on related Chinese vessels on October 14. We have noted that China has announced countermeasures in response. What is China’s comment?

A: On April 17, the USTR announced the final action of Section 301 investigation into China’s maritime, logistics and shipbuilding sectors and will impose port fees on related Chinese vessels from October 14. The U.S. practice severely violates the WTO rules and breaches the principle of equality and mutual benefit of the China-U.S. Maritime Transport Agreement, and is a typical act of unilateralism. China has repeatedly expressed its strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition.

Since the economic and trade talks in London, China has engaged in consultations and communications with the U.S. on the measures mentioned above, provided a written reply to the groundless accusations against China in the Section 301 investigation report, and made recommendations of potential bilateral cooperation in related industries. However, the U.S. has shown a negative attitude and willfully persists in implementing those measures, issuing a notice on October 3 setting out the specific requirements for imposing fees on Chinese vessels. In order to safeguard its legitimate and lawful rights and interests, China has to take countermeasures and decides to charge special port fees on U.S.-linked vessels in accordance with the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on International Ocean Shipping and other laws and regulations. China’s countermeasures are necessary acts of passive defense and are aimed at maintaining the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese industries and enterprises, as well as the level playing-field of the international shipping and shipbuilding markets. It is hoped the U.S. will face up to its mistake, move with China in the same direction, and return to the right track of dialogue and consultation.

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The report was released on the heels of Xi’s visit to Kazakhstan, where he attended the second China-Central Asia summit, which further elevated the ties between China and the 5 Central Asian countries.

The title of the report is Championing the China-Central Asia Spirit: Achievements, Opportunities and Prospects for Regional Cooperation, and the full text in Chinese can be found here.

This newsletter will pick out some of the key parts of the report to present a concise state of play between China and Central Asian countries.

I Achievements

1. Trade

In recent years, China's economic and trade cooperation with Central Asian countries has risen in both quantity and quality, and China has become the largest trading partner and the main source of investment for Central Asian countries. In 2024, China's total trade with Central Asian countries amounted to 94.8 billion U.S. dollars, an increase of 5.4 billion U.S. dollars over the previous year, a growth rate of 7.2%, an increase of hundreds of times compared with the initial 460 million U.S. dollars in the early stage of the establishment of diplomatic relations.

As of December 2024, China's direct investment stock in Central Asian countries exceeded US$17 billion, with cumulative engineering contracting turnover exceeding US$60 billion. Cooperation projects covered oil and gas mining, roads, processing and manufacturing, digital economy, and other fields.

2. Connectivity

The "Angren-Pap" railway tunnel, the longest tunnel in Central Asia built by China, has been completed, ending the history of detouring through other countries for transportation within Uzbekistan and changing the way of travel for tens of millions of people. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Highway crosses the Tianshan Mountains, and the China-Tajikistan-Uzbekistan Highway crosses the Pamir Plateau, continuously weaving a dense cargo trade and transportation network between China and Central Asia, benefiting the people of all countries in the region.

On December 27, 2024, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Project was officially launched. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway starts from Kashgar, Xinjiang, and enters Uzbekistan through Kyrgyzstan. It can be extended to West Asia and South Asia in the future. After the completion of the project, it will improve the southern passage of the New Eurasian Continental Bridge, forming a convenient transportation channel from East Asia and Southeast Asia to Central Asia, West Asia, North Africa, and Southern Europe.

China and the five Central Asian countries have signed intergovernmental air transport agreements. There are now flights connecting China’s Xi'an with 7 cities of the 5 Central Asian countries.

3. Energy

Central Asian countries are important oil and gas producers, and complement China in terms of resources and industrial structure.

As early as 1997, China National Petroleum Corporation successfully won the bid for the Aktobe oilfield development project in Kazakhstan, marking the beginning of China-Kazakhstan oil and gas cooperation. Today, the Aktobe company employs more than 20,000 local people.

In Tajikistan, Chinese energy equipment manufacturing companies completed and put into operation the Dushanbe No. 2 thermal power plant, making the winter power shortage in the Tajik capital a thing of the past; in Kyrgyzstan, with the support of China, the modernization project of the Bishkek thermal power plant was completed, increasing the power generation from the original 262 million kWh per year to 1.74 billion kWh, and the heat supply increased by nearly 100%; in Turkmenistan, the Amu Darya natural gas project operated by China National Petroleum Corporation has built an annual oil and gas equivalent production capacity of tens of millions of tons and an annual gas supply capacity of 10 billion cubic meters.

4. Green

In early April 2025, the Bashi and Zankerdi wind power projects in Uzbekistan, which China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd. participated in the investment, construction and operation, were officially put into operation, becoming the largest wind power project in Central Asia. It is expected to provide about 3 billion kilowatt-hours of clean electricity to the local area each year and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 1.6 million tons.

More and more Chinese companies are investing in and building factories in Central Asia. New energy projects such as the Navoi 100 MW photovoltaic power station in Uzbekistan, the Zhanatas wind farm in Kazakhstan, the Turgusun hydropower station and the Almaty photovoltaic power station have been put into operation, and China Huadian's Aktau gas turbine project and Sheli photovoltaic project in Kazakhstan have started construction.

5. Development

Using technology to alleviate poverty. In recent years, Northwest A&F University has built 8 overseas agricultural technology demonstration parks in Central Asia around advantageous disciplines such as crop breeding, pest and disease control, water-saving irrigation, animal husbandry and veterinary medicine, saline-alkali land management and development, and food processing. The China-Kyrgyzstan Fruit Tree Breeding Technology Demonstration Park was established in 2023 and was jointly built by Northwest A&F University and Kyrgyzstan universities and enterprises.   

6. Security

In September 2024, the first China-Central Asia Public Security and Internal Affairs Ministers' Meeting was launched in Lianyungang, China. The parties reached a number of consensuses on combating transnational crime, extremism, cybercrime, etc., and established a regular information sharing and joint action mechanism. In

In September of the same year, the China-Central Asian Supreme Court Presidents' Meeting was held in Urumqi, Xinjiang. The parties reached a number of consensuses on transnational judicial assistance and joint combat against violent terrorist crimes. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and other countries shared their anti-terrorism legislation and law enforcement experience, and promoted the formation of a new pattern of regional coordinated anti-terrorism.

In April 2025, the sixth China-Central Asia Foreign Ministers' Meeting explicitly supported the establishment of the SCO Anti-Drug Center in Dushanbe, and linked it with the Central Asian Regional Anti-Drug Information Coordination Center to strengthen drug detection and transnational crime.

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II Challenges

1 Against the backdrop of a sluggish global economic recovery, unilateralism and trade protectionism bring further risk shocks.

-International market turmoil may directly affect the export economy of Central Asian countries, especially the export of energy, minerals, and agricultural products.

-Tariff wars and unilateral sanctions pose a threat to the investment environment in Central Asian countries.

-The restructuring of the global supply chain caused by unilateralism has had an impact on the logistics and trade networks of Central Asian countries.

2. Non-traditional security risks cannot be ignored

-Responding to the threats of terrorism and extremism.

-Combat transnational crimes such as drug trafficking and maintain cybersecurity.

-Respond to climate change and ecological threats.

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Below is her story. Original link here and here.

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Remembering bits and pieces of the setting up of the Liaison Office in the U.S.

Time has flown by, and decades have passed since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States in 1979. However, the memory of my own experience working at the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington, D.C., before the normalization of diplomatic ties, remains vivid and unforgettable.

Forming the Liaison Office Team

In April 1973, I was in charge of the Norway desk in the Department of Western Europe Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs①, preparing for the Norwegian Prime Minister’s visit to China. One day, my supervisor told me that after the Norwegian PM’s visit, I would be transferred to the newly established Chinese Liaison Office in Washington. I thought I would have one or two months to prepare for the new role, getting familiar with U.S. affairs. However, after the visit, I returned to Beijing from Guangzhou on May 18 and was immediately informed that I would leave with the mission, led by Ambassador Huang Zhen, for Washington on May 28.

I was both nervous and excited. Firstly, I knew very little about the United States, only what I had read in the newspapers. Secondly, my primary language in the Western Europe Department was Norwegian, with English used less frequently. I was unsure whether I would be able to quickly adapt and perform well in an English-speaking environment.

The creation of the Liaison Office was a special arrangement before the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations. In February 1973, during Kissinger's fifth visit to China, the two sides agreed to establish liaison offices in each other's capitals by the end of May 1973. Chairman Mao personally appointed Ambassador Huang Zhen as the head of the office. Before his departure, Huang met with Mao, who emphasized that the Liaison Office was "more of an embassy than an embassy." Typically, an embassy has one ambassador, but both the head and deputy head of the Liaison Office were of ambassadorial rank, underscoring the significance China placed on the office.

As part of the first group of staff accompanying Ambassador Huang Zhen and his wife to Washington, we not only carried our personal luggage but also brought along a considerable amount of office supplies needed for the Liaison Office, including the office’s plaque and national flag. Additionally, we brought valuable art pieces for the living room and reception areas, some of which were special items that Ambassador Huang had requested from the central government and, with Premier Zhou Enlai’s approval, borrowed from the Palace Museum. These included 25 priceless ancient artifacts and art treasures, such as Shang Dynasty bronzeware, Tang Dynasty tri-color pottery, Ming and Qing porcelain, the Along the River During the Qingming Festival painting, as well as works by renowned masters like Xu Beihong and Wu Changshuo.

Because these items were national treasures, we could not have them in check-in luggage. Therefore, we requested the airline's permission to have these pieces as carry-on. During the flight, we took turns every two hours to monitor the safety of the items. We carefully counted the items to ensure none were lost during flight transfers.

A High-Profile Welcome in Washington

On May 29, we arrived in Washington, where a crowd of over 200 people was waiting at the airport to welcome us. U.S. officials, including Deputy National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Arthur W. Hummel Jr., and Chief of Protocol Marion H. Smoak, Chief of the China desk, as well as diplomats from friendly nations, were all present to greet the first PRC diplomatic mission to the U.S. Local Chinese Americans were also there to show their support, although due to security reasons, they were kept at a distance.

This was the first time that PRC diplomatic representatives set foot in the U.S. capital, Washington. The welcome was warm and enthusiastic.

The next day, an American friend, Mr. Randolph Clothier Sailer, and his family took it upon themselves to place a full-page ad in The Washington Post to warmly welcome Ambassador Huang and the first team of Chinese diplomats. Many other American friends sent flowers to express their congratulations and well-wishes.

Following recommendations from the U.S. side, the advance team led by Deputy Director Han Xu had already arranged accommodation for us. We stayed at the Mayflower Hotel, one of the best hotels in Washington, located near the White House, major government buildings, and the Capitol. The Mayflower became the first headquarters of the Liaison Office.

My work involved reading the news to Ambassador Huang every morning, covering major newspapers such as The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Christian Science Monitor, as well as magazines like Time and U.S. News & World Report. I was also in charge of organizing activities for Ambassador Huang and his wife, Deputy Director Han, sending out diplomatic notices, dealing with correspondence of the director and the deputy director, and serving as personal translator for Zhu Lin, the wife of Huang.

On the afternoon of his arrival, Ambassador Huang had a meeting with Kissinger. That evening, Hummel hosted a dinner at the State Department to welcome him. The next morning, Huang was driven to the White House to meet President Nixon. Besides public talks and photo ops, they had a private conversation for nearly half an hour. Nixon wished Ambassador Huang well in settling down in Washington and briefly explained the name of the Mayflower Hotel: In September 1620, 102 English Puritans, calling themselves "Pilgrims," set sail from England aboard the Mayflower to the North American colonies. The Mayflower was the first ship to carry Puritan immigrants to North America. It symbolizes the beginning of America. Nixon remarked, "Ambassador Huang is also opening up new horizons," to which Ambassador Huang replied, "May the Mayflower blossom for the people of both China and the United States."

July 4th is U.S. Independence Day, the country's National Day. That evening, Kissinger hosted a banquet at the State Department's seventh-floor hall for Ambassador Huang, his wife, Deputy Director Han, and all the staff of the Liaison Office. After the dinner, he invited everyone to watch the fireworks from the State Department's rooftop. Such a unique honor was granted only to the Chinese Liaison Office at that time, highlighting the U.S. side's emphasis on Sino-U.S. relations.

On July 6th, at the invitation of President Nixon, Ambassador Huang and his wife flew on Air Force One to visit the Western White House② in San Clemente, California, accompanied by Kissinger. The Nixons welcomed the Huangs with the warmth and hospitality reserved for friends.

In the first month of Ambassador Huang’s tenure, his schedule was packed with meetings with senior U.S. officials. He visited the Congress to meet with Republican and Democratic leaders from both the Senate and the House, as well as several prominent senators and congressmen. The level of hospitality he received in Washington was unparalleled in the history of U.S. diplomacy, and no other foreign diplomats were treated in such a way. At that time, not only did the head and deputy head of the Liaison Office frequently engage with U.S. White House and State Department officials, but even the counselors and secretaries had regular and friendly exchanges with officials at all levels.

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Celebrating the National Day

On October 1, the Liaison Office held its first National Day reception at the Mayflower Hotel. The event was a moment of immense pride for all of us, symbolizing a significant milestone in Sino-U.S. relations. About 500 guests attended, including high-ranking officials such as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, Deputy National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Assistant Secretary of State Richardson (Possibly John Richardson Jr), Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Arthur W. Hummel, House Speaker Carl Albert, Senate party leaders Michael J. Mansfield and Hugh D. Scott, Jr, Chairmans of the Senate and House Foreign committees and other important U.S. senators such as Jackson (Likely Henry Jackson) and Kennedy (Likely Ted Kennedy), alongside the D.C. mayor and guests of other sectors.

Kissinger once told Ambassador Huang that he did not attend any embassy receptions or banquets because there were more than 150 embassies in Washington, and setting such a precedent would mean he would have to attend events at all of them. Ambassador Huang immediately replied, "We are not an embassy; we are a Liaison Office." Kissinger humorously responded, "I will accept any invitation from the Liaison Office." From then on, Kissinger became a regular guest at the Liaison Office's events.

I also remember an interesting anecdote from that time. The famous Washington journalist Anderson (Possibly Jack Anderson) showed up uninvited. He proactively went to the Mayflower Hotel to attend the reception and interviewed everyone from the hotel owner to the staff, security officers, and even construction workers nearby (those working on the metro construction) to learn about the Chinese staff at the Liaison Office. Later, he wrote an article for the Parade, in which he objectively introduced the new style and image of the Liaison Office's diplomats, praising the excellent conduct of the new Chinese diplomats. The article was well-received by the American public, generating widespread impact across the U.S. Many people, after reading the article, reached out to the Liaison Office to engage with the Chinese diplomats and make friends.

Enjoying Special Treatment

To ensure the safety of the embassy district, police cars patrol the area every day. During the more than seven months of stay of the Chinese Liaison Office at the Mayflower Hotel, the U.S. provided a team of security officers (from the Secret Service, responsible for presidential-level protection), who took turns guarding the hotel 24/7. They also reserved one of the hotel's elevators exclusively for the Liaison Office's use.

Additionally, they connected the floors of the two main residences of the head and deputy head of the Liaison Office with wires and modern equipment, creating a secure link between the upper, middle, and lower floors to prevent intruders from climbing through windows and causing harm. When Liaison Office staff went out, they were always accompanied by security officers. The U.S. also provided a bulletproof car for Ambassador Huang's external activities. When the Liaison Office moved out of the Mayflower Hotel and into its own property, the Windsor Park Hotel, the U.S. removed this level of security, replacing it with two policemen stationed in front of the Liaison Office until the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S., when it officially became an embassy.

The Liaison Office was a special arrangement. Although it wasn't officially an embassy due to the lack of diplomatic relations, it enjoyed all diplomatic privileges and, in many ways, received even more special treatment.

For instance, the U.S. State Department had a rule requiring diplomats and staff of certain embassies (primarily those from socialist countries) to obtain written permission three days in advance from the State Department if they planned to travel more than 25 miles outside Washington, D.C. However, the Chinese Liaison Office only needed to make a verbal request to the State Department’s Protocol Office, which would approve via the phone.

On weekends and public holidays, the U.S. arranged for us to visit and tour Washington's landmarks and nearby historical sites, such as the Gettysburg battlefield, Williamsburg, and Mount Vernon.

The U.S. authorities also frequently screened American films in the corridor of the Mayflower Hotel where we were staying, including programs about American culture like Today in America and National Geographic films about American landscapes, as well as popular movies at the time, such as Love Story, The Godfather, and Murder of De Gaulle. These films not only enriched our cultural life but also helped us learn more about the United States.

The hotel owner, William Hallett (transliteration), was very friendly to us. Knowing that Chinese people love table tennis, he specially bought a ping-pong table and paddles for the Liaison Office and placed them in the corridor. Later, he even cleared out a large room for us to exercise in, hoping that we would enjoy our time at the hotel as if we were in China.

Just before the Liaison Office moved out of the Mayflower Hotel, the hotel owner threw a farewell party for all the staff. Following American customs, he treated everyone to barbecue beef, hot dogs, and had a band play country music. He also gave each person a cowboy hat and a small cloth scarf. The atmosphere was incredibly friendly and warm.

At that time, when Ambassador Huang and his wife returned to China for a debriefing, Deputy Director Han Xu led the staff to attend and presented Chinese handicrafts as a token of appreciation to the hotel owner on behalf of the Liaison Office. The hotel owner also gave Deputy Director Han a business card with his signature, telling him that he could enjoy free steak at any of his steak restaurants③. Additionally, the hotel owner specially nailed a brass plaque on the door of the room where Ambassador Huang and his wife had stayed, commemorating their time there as a permanent memento.

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Moving into the Windsor Park Hotel

There was a problem when purchasing the Windsor Park Hotel. According to Washington, D.C.'s Zoning and Planning Act, the height of any building in the city could not exceed the height of the Capitol. The residential area where the Windsor Park Hotel is located, at 2300 Connecticut Avenue, was not allowed to be used for office purposes, and its exterior could not be altered without permission.

To address this, Ambassador Huang and Deputy Director Han met with the mayor of Washington to discuss the matter and requested the mayor's assistance. Fortunately, the mayor was relatively friendly toward China. After patient and friendly negotiations, the Washington City Council finally approved the mayor's explanation. Meanwhile, Zhu Lin, wife of Huang, visited local HOA leaders and several of the key neighbors to conduct friendly neighbor relations work, which helped resolve any objections from the surrounding residents.

At the end of 1973, after the Liaison Office moved into the newly purchased Windsor Park Hotel, one of the major tasks we faced was how to transform the hotel into a suitable facility for diplomatic work. The construction team sent from China consisted of more than ten people, but only five or six were skilled workers, and the scale of the renovation project was considerable. The manpower was clearly insufficient. In the spirit of hard work and frugality, the leadership of the Liaison Office discussed the matter and engaged all the staff in the decision-making process. After considering various factors, it was decided not to hire local workers and instead to have everyone pitch in and do the work themselves.

All diplomats and staff members took turns participating in physical labor. The transformation of the lobby, entrance hall, banquet hall, and several meeting rooms required knocking down many partition walls, raising the ceiling of the lobby, polishing terrazzo floors, and other tasks, all of which were largely carried out by diplomats and staff members who took turns working. For safety reasons, all windows and doors on the first floor had to be fitted with iron bars. Ambassador Huang personally took part, working alongside the laborers to design the patterns for the iron windows. The iron barriers were both aesthetically pleasing and met safety requirements. The female staff members also played their part, with Zhu Lin leading the effort to paste wallpaper, paint doors and windows, and take on the task of sewing curtains for the entire building.

The backyard of the building was overgrown with weeds and uneven ground. The leadership of the Liaison Office once again rallied everyone, making use of weekends and spare time to clear the weeds and garbage, level the ground, and transform more than half of it into a parking lot and sports field, with a small portion designated as a vegetable garden. In just over a month, the work was completed. This not only improved the environment and solved the parking problem but also created a sports field and a vegetable garden. A staff member from a farming background, who knew how to grow vegetables, voluntarily took responsibility for the gardening tasks. With assistance from other colleagues, vegetables were soon planted in the backyard. Zhu Lin also worked with him, growing mung bean sprouts in the bathtub to supply the kitchen with more vegetables and improve the meals.

When the renovation project was completed, the entire building, inside and out, looked brand new. Some visiting delegations from China who saw the results of the Liaison Office’s self-reliant and hard-working renovation were full of praise, saying, “You’ve turned an old hotel’s dining room into a hall that looks like the Great Hall of the People. It’s not easy!” Many local Americans, hearing about this, also came to visit and expressed their admiration.

In the 1970s, the wage level in China was much lower than it is now. I clearly remember that when I started working at the Liaison Office in May 1973, my monthly salary was just over 30 dollars, which meant I earned only about 1 dollar a day! For people today, this is almost unbelievable. However, at that time, although our wages were very low, everyone was full of enthusiasm, worked joyfully, and was happy. The entire Liaison Office was united, focused, and energetic, like a big revolutionary family.

The Liaison Office only existed for less than six years before it became an embassy, but it truly provided excellent training and improvement for me in various aspects, whether it was foreign languages, diplomatic work skills, or policy knowledge. During this time, I learned a great deal and gained a lot of benefits. It is an experience that I will forever cherish in my life.

Footnotes:

① The department became the Department of European Affairs in 2004.

② La Casa Pacifica

③ According to wikipedia, one of the owners of the hotel at the time was Ulysses "Blackie" Augur, a Washington restaurateur who made a fortune selling beef. It’s possible that the author was referring to Augur.

Beijing Story is a series I started in 2023. It is dedicated to sharing anecdotes of China’s past diplomatic endeavors. If you like this series and would like to see more stories, please like, comment, or share. Thank You!

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This post echoes what Brooking’s Ryan Hass observed during a recent China visit as China’s three solutions to fending Washington’s tariff offensive.

Below is a complete translation of the blog.

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Over the past few days, Commerce Minister Wang Wentao has been on a whirlwind of calls:

• Apr 8: Video call (Eng link) with Maroš Šefčovič, EU Commissioner for Trade & Economic Security

• Apr 9: Video call (Eng link) with Tengku Zafrul, Trade & Industry Minister of Malaysia (current ASEAN chair)

• Apr 10: Video call (Chn link) with Parks Tau, Trade & Industry Minister of South Africa (current G20 chair)

• Apr 10: Video call (Chn link) with Majid Al‑Kasabi, Saudi Minister of Commerce

• Apr 11: Video call (Chn link) with Geraldo Alckmin, Brazil’s Vice‑President and Minister of Development, Industry, Trade & Services (current BRICS chair)

• Apr 11: Video call (Eng link) with WTO Director‑General Ngozi Okonjo‑Iweala

All these conversations had one big topic in common: how to handle Washington’s so‑called “reciprocal” tariffs. Beijing plans to keep talking with more partners and ramp up coordination against the new U.S. duties.

Before the April 8 video conference, Šefčovič visited China in late March. The readout (Chn link) of his visit mentioned that

China and EU exchanged views in a candid, in-depth and pragmatic manner.

Compared with the visit readout, the April 8 video call readout struck a more positive tone and was more substantial. During the video conference, China and the EU primarily reached 4 consensus.

1. Stand together against U.S. tariff hikes and defend the WTO‑centered multilateral trading system alongside other WTO members.

2. Start consultation on issues concerning market access at an early date. Market access has always been the heart of the China‑EU trade and investment relationship. In the past, this issue was discussed under the context of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. In prior negotiations, both China and the EU have made pledges for high-level market access for the manufacturing, financial services, medical and healthcare services, and biomedicine sectors. In the video conference, both sides once again touched on the issue of market access.

3. Immediately start negotiations on electric vehicle pricing commitments. This blog has learned that teams on both sides are already in touch.

4. Resume the China-EU trade remedy dialogue mechanism. This blog has learned that the existing mechanism had been dormant for years due to several reasons. Restarting the mechanism shows that both sides are taking a pragmatic and cooperative approach to solving the problems in the trade relationship. This proves the responsibility and resolve of the two major economies in preserving the global trade order.

On the call with Malaysia’s Tengku Zafrul, Zafrul noted that Washington’s tariffs run counter to the principles of free and fair trade as set out by the World Trade Organization. Zafrul said his country will engage in consultations with other ASEAN members to jointly respond to the so-called "reciprocal tariffs" and other moves proposed by the United States.

Wang’s calls with relevant parties also explored how to make better use of multilateral arenas such as BRICS and the G20. During Wang’s call with WTO Director‑General Ngozi Okonjo‑Iweala, she emphasized that WTO members must stand shoulder to shoulder to protect an open, rules‑based trading system and resolve differences through dialogue and cooperation within the WTO framework.

Confronted with Washington’s unilateral pressure tactics, an ever‑growing number of countries are choosing openness, cooperation, and multilateralism as the antidote to unilateralism, protectionism, and bullying.

This blog reads two signals from these calls.

1. The U.S. tariff blitz is facing pushback—and China is uniting with the force for justice and fairness in global trade.

On April 10 , Washington announced it would jack up its tariff against Chinese goods to 125% from 84 %, in an unmistakable move against China. In the meantime, China is reaching out to forces that are willing to protect the international trade system.

China is the EU’s biggest import source; the EU is China’s No. 2 trading partner. Brussels now says it wants broader two‑way market access, investment, and industrial cooperation.

This blog went over investment-related news from the EU in the recent month and discovered that the EU shows strong interest in AI, infrastructure, solar, and EV investment—areas where Chinese investment in the EU is welcomed. There is broad space for cooperation in these fields by China and the EU. Take EV as an example. Last year, there were differences between the two sides on EVs, but that didn’t prevent the two sides from cooperating. More data shows that the Chinese industrial chain is irreplaceable for the EU. According to statistics, Europe’s fastest‑growing firm in recent years is a Polish solar company whose meteoric rise (830.8 percent between 2020‑2023) relies heavily on Chinese‑made panels and gear.

With ASEAN, it and China have been each other’s No. 1 trading partner for five straight years. In 2024, bilateral trade hit 982.1 billion USD, 16 % of China’s global total.

As the U.S. unilaterally launched the trade war, China’s job is to forge ties with any player willing to defend an open system, that mean not just with ASEAN or not just the EU.

2. More countries now see through Washington’s tariff blackmail.

China was the first to hit back against the “reciprocal” tariffs, standing up for global fairness.

Some worry that if others cut separate deals with the U.S., China could be left isolated. This blog wants to say Beijing’s stance is clear: China has no opinion one way or the other if other countries decide to retaliate against the U.S. or enter negotiations, as it is a sovereign decision. But Beijing won’t tolerate actors trading away China’s interests for favors in Washington.

Trade expert Cui Fan (of UIBE) notes that capitulating to U.S. pressure only invites more demands. Real pushback requires collective action.

On April 12, U.S. media, including CNBC, reported that Trump exempts phones, computers, and chips from new tariffs. This shows that Washington knows exactly how “reciprical tariffs” would hurt itself.

During Šefčovič’s earlier visit to Beijing, this blog observed that the Chinese side gave him a T‑shirt as a gift. The shirt is made from fibers spun out of captured CO₂—supplied by a Chinese firm that built the world’s first negative‑carbon industrial chain. This same company is also in the solar panel business. One of its subsidiaries is China’s largest EVA solar panel supplier, taking up over 30% of domestic output. In 2018, the company was the victim of U.S. solar tariffs and faced difficulties. However, the company doubled down on R&D, cracked foreign monopolies, and blunted the trade‑war shock.

That shirt is a small symbol of a larger reality: Pressure may be fierce, but Chinese industry keeps innovating—standing tall rather than bowing. Increasingly, other nations are ready to take a stand, too.

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Compared with a similar conference dedicated to neighborhood diplomacy held in October 2013, there are some visibly similar formulations or “提法” that underscore the consistency of China’s policies in dealing with neighboring countries. In the meantime, the conference also gave an updated appraisal of China’s immediate surrounding and explained new considerations and context that guides Beijing’s neighboring country diplomacy going forward.

Multiple polical blogs (here, here) hailed the conference as the “first of its kind”.

This newsletter offers a translation of the official readout and some footnotes on some the the language I think is worth paying attention to.

【1】TRANSLATION

Note: This is a personal translation for your reference only. Check out the original Chinese text for accurate meaning. Official Xinhua English report (not full translation) here.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has called for building a community with a shared future with neighboring countries and striving to open new ground for China's neighborhood work.

Xi, also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, made the remarks at a central conference on work related to neighboring countries, which was held in Beijing from Tuesday to Wednesday.

The Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries① was held in Beijing from April 8 to 9. Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC), President of the People's Republic of China, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, attended the conference and delivered an important speech. Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, including Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, and Li Xi, as well as Vice President of China, Han Zheng, also attended the meeting.

In his important speech, Xi Jinping systematically summarized the achievements and experiences of China's work on neighboring countries in the new era②, scientifically analyzed the current situation, clarified the goals, tasks, and approaches for neighboring countries work in the future, and emphasized the need to focus on building A Neighborhood Community with a Shared Future, striving to break new ground on the work related to neighboring countries. Li Qiang, who moderated the conference, emphasized the need to earnestly implement the spirit of Xi Jinping's important speech and solidly ensure the implementation of tasks laid out by the conference.

The conference pointed out that China is vast with long borders, and its surrounding areas are an important foundation for development and prosperity, a key to safeguarding national security, the foremost priority for managing foreign affairs, and a focal point in promoting the construction of a community of shared future for mankind. Conducting work related to neighboring countries should be viewed from a global perspective, enhancing the sense of responsibility and mission for such work.③

The conference highlighted that since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, under the strong leadership of the CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core, China conducted diplomacy related to neighboring countries in the spirit of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness, advocating the building of a Neighborhood Community with a Shared Future, leading the way with head-of-state diplomacy, deepening all-round cooperation, strengthening exchanges in various fields, and jointly maintaining peace and stability. This has formed a pragmatic and efficient framework for work related to neighboring countries, leading to historic achievements and heralding historic changes. The experience gained through practice should be preserved and continuously applied.

The conference points out that, currently, China’s relations with its surrounding countries are at their best in modern history, and an important phase of profound interaction between the surrounding environment and global changes has arrived. ③ It emphasized the need to continue to be guided by Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, focusing on the central tasks of the Party and the state, coordinating both domestic and foreign affairs, and addressing the major issues of development and security. The banner of a community of shared future should be upheld. Working with neighboring countries to create a better future by aiming for a common vision of building the "Five Homelands" of peace, tranquility, prosperity, beauty and friendship④, following the principles of building an amicable, peaceful and prosperous neighborhood, amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness⑤, and shared future⑥, embodying the Asian values of peace, cooperation, openness, and inclusiveness⑦, utilizing the high quality Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a platform, and resting on the strategic pillars of Asian security model featuring shared security, seeking common ground while shelving differences, and dialogue and consultation⑧.

The meeting emphasized that building a community with a shared future with neighboring countries requires consolidating strategic mutual trust, supporting regional nations in pursuing stable development paths suited to their national conditions, and properly managing differences and disagreements. It called for deepening development integration by establishing high-level connectivity networks and strengthening industrial and supply chain cooperation. Joint efforts should be made to uphold regional stability, carry out security and law enforcement cooperation, and address various risks and challenges. People-to-people exchanges should be expanded, and the movement of people facilitated.

The meeting stressed that, to carry out work related to neighboring countries effectively, it is imperative to strengthen the centralized and unified leadership of the CPC Central Committee and enhance coordination across various sectors. Institutional reform should be deepened, and the legal and regulatory framework concerning foreign affairs should be enhanced. Capacity building and talent development must be advanced, and innovation of theory and practice in work related to neighboring countries should be promoted.

Wang Yi delivered a concluding speech.

Relevant leaders and officials of the Party and the State attended the meeting.

Footnotes:

① The name of the conference (中央周边工作会议) is slightly different from the one in 2013 (周边外交工作座谈会). It left out the word “diplomatic” (外交) while adding “central” (中央), and the Chinese word for conference was upgraded from [座谈会] in 2013 to the more formal [会议] in 2025. Personally, I read the name change to signal an elevation of the importance of the meeting. The word central certainly adds more prestige, while taking out diplomatic suggests the meeting carried significance that extended beyond the realm of foreign policy. And for those following closely, events attended by all PBSC members AND the VP aren’t often.

②Here, new era refers to time after the 18th Party Congress in 2012.

③ Twice, the readout connects work related to neighboring countries and world affairs, contextualizing how Beijing views the role of work related to neighboring countries.

④First put forward by Xi while addressing the ASEAN-China Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations in Nov. 2021.

⑤ [following the principles of building an amicable, peaceful, and prosperous neighborhood, amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness] or [睦邻、安邻、富邻，亲诚惠容] was first put forward in the 2013 conference on neighboring countries.

⑥ Compared with the guiding principle for neighborhood diplomacy laid out in 2013, namely ⑤, the words “shared future” are added. Though the wording is not new and has appeared in numerous speeches and documents, the addition of the word to the guiding principle is nevertheless a new emphasis. Taking into consideration footnote ⑧, which highlighted “shared security“, the addition of the two “shared” to me represents a more clear message to neighboring countries: we are in this together.

⑦ Xi first coined the term Asian values in addressing the ASEAN-China Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations in Nov. 2021. He later specified the value as “peace, cooperation, inclusiveness and integration” in October 2023, in remarks sent to the international symposium to commemorate the 10th anniversary of China's principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness in neighborhood diplomacy. As late as December 2024, the values were still stated as such, but in this conference, the word integration was replaced by openness.

⑧ The Asian security model, described as featuring “featuring mutual respect, seeking common ground while shelving differences and dialogue and consultation” was raised by Wang Yi during the international symposium to commemorate the 10th anniversary of China's principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness in neighborhood diplomacy in October 2023. In the conference readout, the part on “mutual respect” was replaced by “shared security”.

On a related note, during the 4th Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia Summit held in Shanghai in 2014, Xi said, “China will work along with other parties to advocate Asia security concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable.”

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【2】Dive Deeper

In February, Contemporary World, a monthly journal run by the International Department of CPC Central Committee, published three essays by Chinese scholars on neighborhood diplomacy, which expounded on some of the points raised in the conference readout. I picked some of them out but encourage you to read their full essays if you are interested in this topic. The journal is inviting more experts to weigh in on the subject in coming issues, I’ll share more if something catches my eye.

※ On the achievements of neighborhood diplomacy since the 18th Party Congress, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences’ Wang Jian writes:

Since the 18th CPC National Congress, the construction of a community with a shared future in the region has been continuously implemented. China has issued action plans, joint statements or reached important consensus on building a bilateral community with a shared future with Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Mongolia, and has achieved full coverage of implementing a community with a shared future for mankind at the bilateral level with the five Central Asian countries. The construction of a China-ASEAN community with a shared future has continued to advance, and China, the five Mekong countries and the five Central Asian countries have announced the joint construction of a Lancang-Mekong community with a shared future and a China-Central Asia community with a shared future.

In 2022, the total trade volume between China and its neighboring countries reached 2.64 trillion U.S. dollars, accounting for 41.9% of China's total global trade.

The global security initiative continues to be implemented in the surrounding areas and has been written into the joint government statements between China and Russia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Mongolia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the five Central Asian countries, respectively.

Put simply in numbers:

Among the 29 countries China shares a border with, China has reached a consensus to build a community of shared future with 17, signed BRI documents with 25, and is the largest trading partner with 18.

※ Concerning viewing neighborhood diplomacy in the context of the shifting global landscape, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies’ Zhou Fangyin writes:

Against the backdrop of a turbulent international environment, with Trump returning to power, relations between major powers in China's neighboring regions face greater uncertainty, and the complexity of security and economic issues will become more intertwined. At present and in the future, the security environment facing China's neighboring diplomacy will become more complex.

First, relations between major powers face greater uncertainty. Since the end of 2017, the United States has significantly increased its containment efforts against China.

Secondly, as the United States continues to promote "mini-multilateral mechanisms" around China, the trend of camp formation among countries surrounding China has become increasingly obvious.

Thirdly, security factors continue to interfere more with economic cooperation, more issues on the regional agenda are influenced by security factors, and the zero-sum game mentality in the security field has a greater impact on regional affairs.

Finally, the direction of hot issues in China’s neighborhood is significantly driven by changes in major power relations and the reorganization of relations among neighboring countries, making management and control more difficult.

※On shared Asian values, China Institute of International Studies’ Liu Qing writes:

Asian values ​​are the crystallization of the spiritual and cultural wisdom of Asian countries, reflect the commonality of Asian civilization, and are the value basis for collective identity between China and its neighboring countries.

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The 2-and-a-half-hour long panel, part of the World Peace Forum Winter Series, featured leading Chinese IR scholars in China, Yan Xuetong, Wang Jisi, and Zhang Yuyan, and was moderated by Li Bin.

Yan Xuetong is a distinguished university professor at THU and a foreign member of the Russia Academy of Science. He is the Dean of The Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University. He has recently published a piece titled Why China isn’t scared of Trump on Foreign Affairs.

WANG Jisi is a Professor at the School of International Studies and President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies, at Peking University. He has been the Peking University Boya Chair Professor since 2017. He is honorary president of the Chinese Association for American Studies. He has written many times for Foreign Affairs.

ZHANG Yuyan is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)

Li Bin is a professor at THU, where he is in charge of the Arms Control Program. He is on the editorial board of Science & Global Security, the editorial board of Nonproliferation Review, a board member of the China Arms Control Association, and a board member of the China-U.S. Friendship Association.

In the interest of Beijing Channel readers, below is an exclusive English translation of the panel’s transcript. The transcript has been edited for concision.

Part I Opening Remarks

Wang Jisi

The positioning and characterization of Sino-US relations are very clear. Both China and the U.S. view each other as major strategic 对手. In English, the U.S. side often uses the word "Rival". Therefore, I believe "对手" is a more accurate description—seeing the other as a primary strategic competitor and also as a main security threat.

When I say that China considers the U.S. its primary security threat, I have indeed written articles expressing this view. Additionally, I have written that the U.S. is the biggest foreign security threat. However, this does not represent the official stance; it is my personal opinion.

This kind of strategic posture may last 10 years or even decades. Some people refer to the Cold War, which lasted 43 years. The Sino-U.S. relationship entered a similar state of confrontation about 10 years ago and may last as long as the Cold War, or even longer. Of course, I might not see the end of it. Some might wonder what the endgame of it will be, I believe there might not be an endgame, at least not one during my lifetime.

About a decade ago, I wrote an article with an American friend (Kenneth Lieberthal), Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust. The greatest distrust from the American side, as they express it, is the belief that China's goal is not only to enhance its international status and achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation but also to weaken America's hegemonic position. In their eyes these two goals are inseparable. In other words, when I told Americans that we do not intend to do anything to the U.S. and that we just want to strengthen ourselves, they didn't believe me. They said that based on decades of observation, and increasingly so, they believe that we want to weaken the U.S.

The greatest distrust from the Chinese side is towards what is known as the "Four Nos and One No Intention". (The United States does not seek a new Cold War, does not seek to revitalize alliances against China, does not support “Taiwan independence”, does not support “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan”, and has no intention to have a conflict with China) Are these statements true? To a considerable extent, they are not telling the truth. Is the U.S. trying to contain China? I think most Chinese say that the U.S. is trying to contain China, aiming to weaken China's political or leadership system. This kind of mutual distrust has now become deeply ingrained and will continue to deepen, leading to a zero-sum mentality—what I gain is your loss, and what you gain is my loss. This kind of thinking exists on both sides.

The official Chinese position is that the two countries should respect each other, coexist in peace, and pursue win-win cooperation. At least openly, the Americans haven't embraced this proposal. The U.S. characterizes Sino-U.S. relations as strategic competition, which the Chinese do not accept. As a scholar looking at this issue, I think the Chinese side presents it as a vision, hoping for it to be that way. However, the reality isn't like that yet; it's an ultimate goal. The U.S. side is describing the status quo, which is strategic competition.

Secondly, what are the reasons for the changes or the continued deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations? Some people say it's the "Thucydides Trap"—as long as China's power rises and US power declines, the U.S. will worry and seek to contain China. I can’t say it's completely unreasonable, but I don't think it's a decisive factor.

The reason is that I think the changes in the balance of power haven't been fundamentally or radically transformative; China is still China, and China's strength remains very strong. China’s power is second only to the U.S. in the world and surpasses all other countries by a wide margin. As for the United States? It won't decline quickly. Can Trump fundamentally enhance U.S. power? I don't think so. I recently read an article by two American scholars, Jude Blanchett and Ryan Hass. They co-wrote the piece "Know your rival, Know yourself," meaning you need to know your enemy, know your opponent, and know yourself. The main focus of their article is on the state of Sino-U.S. relations. I think they would agree with my characterization of Sino-U.S. relations. They describe in considerable detail the changes occurring in China and in the United States. Whether what they say is right or wrong can be discussed separately, but I believe they have captured the essence of a problem: these two countries are undergoing profound changes.

How should we view Sino-U.S. relations in the future? I think it depends on the changes happening within both countries, not just the balance of power but also, the changes in global politics.

Finally, let me talk about Trump's coming to power. Let me say this: Trump has overestimated his own strength and status. There’s an element of bluster to the things Trump says, and some of it might be things he genuinely wants to do. But he will at most have four years in office, I don't think it's possible to complete everything he wants to do. I believe it's beyond his capability. Many people take his words very seriously. Personally, I don’t want to take every word of his so seriously. What’s important is what he does after taking office, not what he says every day.

When it comes to relations with China, once Trump takes office, China needs and should communicate with Trump’s team to understand who they really are and what they intend to do. This will definitely be different from Trump's first term and different from Biden’s approach, so there is an opportunity for mutual understanding and communication. During this period, if there aren’t any sudden incidents like the balloon incident two years ago, we may just avoid the worst in the coming months. At least that’s my hope. At the same time, economic cooperation may continue, at least to some extent, cultural exchanges might develop, and military exchanges shouldn’t be completely cut off.

I think the possibility of a Sino-U.S. war is very small, and peaceful coexistence is achievable. The conflicts are mainly concentrated in the economic and technological fields, and there may continue to be disagreements in many areas. However, militarily, I believe both sides are unwilling to go to war and have the ability to control themselves from doing so.

Recently, in my interaction with Americans, they are concerned about three major issues. However, I can’t say if these are the main concerns after Trump comes to power. What I can say now is that the issues the U.S. side is focusing on. First, the South China Sea issue, which involves military relations between both sides, or whether a crisis management mechanism can be established. Second, Americans are very concerned about cybersecurity, saying that some organized Chinese hackers have attacked U.S. websites. Many people in the U.S., including the current Secretary of the Treasury, have raised these issues. Third, the relationship between China and Russia. China’s cooperation with Russia, such as the use of Chinese technology and dual-use products in Russia’s conflict with Ukraine, is a concern. They hope China won’t provide Russia with such support. Will Trump immediately address these issues once he takes office? I can’t say. At least for now, these are the main concerns from the US side.

Zhang Yuyan

What kind of relationship will Trump have with the Biden administration? I used a simple expression called “B规T随,” which is derived from “萧规曹随” (a Chinese idiom meaning to follow established rules). Here, "B" stands for Biden, and "T" stands for Trump. Trump has continued many of Biden's policies, specifically in terms of China policy. (Zhang is basically saying Trump will follow Biden’s footsteps on China)

The Biden administration’s national security strategy explicitly positions China as the only country capable and willing to change the current international system. The strategy states that we are “in the early years of a decisive decade for America and the world”. This sentence is short but loaded. What does this mean? I understand it to imply that within ten years the result of strategic competition will be clearly determined. The strategy continues to say that “The window of opportunity to deal with shared threats, like climate change, will narrow drastically”. This is the Biden administration’s national security strategy’s assessment of the overall global situation, which directly names China. Their top priority is to seek and maintain comprehensive superiority over China. Most likely, the Trump administration will continue this set of China policies. From the officials he has already appointed, whenever they talk about China, they use the same rhetoric and tone. I don’t think there will be significant changes.

Though we don’t need to hang onto Trump’s every single word, based on what we have already grasped and heard, and after our analysis, China should still analyze what exactly is said by Trump.

First, Tariffs. The two largest economies in the world combined account for over 40% of the global GDP. Currently, the average tariff is 20%. If tariffs are increased by another 60%, it would be unprecedented, and the impact on the world is obvious.

Second, in the Technology Sector. Since China has been positioned as a competitive adversary, there will be stricter controls on high-tech industries, especially those related to security. It is feared that more severe restrictions will be implemented, including on exports. This applies not only to the export of American high-tech products and technologies but also extends to allied and partner countries.

Several people have already proposed canceling China's Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR), which is simply known as Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status. This would have a significant impact. With the two largest economies involved, canceling MFN status would set a very bad precedent.

Yan Xuetong

I want to discuss Trump’s impact from three perspectives. First, on the values of globalization. Second, on the development of the digital economy and economic globalization. Third, on the diplomatic strategies of various countries.

Let’s start with values. If you look at Trump's vote counts, in 2016 he received over 60 million votes, and in 2020 he received 74 million votes but lost. It wasn’t because he did a poor job over four years; his support increased by more than 10 million despite the loss, and this time it increased again to 77 million. This fact indicates that whether Trump wins or loses, the trend of supporting Trump’s populist values in the U.S. is on the rise. In other words, it’s very likely that populism is not only an upward trend over these eight years but may continue for a longer period after Trump. These values are opposed to liberal values. As seen in many of his policies, he opposes globalization, which is driven by liberal values. After the Cold War, at least domestically in the U.S., populist values are on the rise, competing with liberalism for influence. My personal feeling is that within at least the next ten years, liberalism in the U.S. is likely to be in decline. Its influence is decreasing rather than increasing. After the Cold War, liberalism quickly rose to prominence, but under the impact of populism, its influence was gradually waning. This struggle has reached a point where populism may have greater influence than liberalism. It’s possible that four years from now, populism will be the most influential value system in the U.S., surpassing liberalism.

We find it strange that Trump's election has made the entire world anxious—not only America’s competitors and enemies but also its allies are tense. My understanding is that Trump may represent not only the rising populist forces within the U.S. but also the rising populist forces globally. In Europe, for example, populism is also rising rapidly, with many populist leaders coming to power. This means that the liberal values promoted by the U.S. after the Cold War, such as "human rights above sovereignty," are likely beginning to decline. Globally, populism is rising to replace the previously dominant liberalism. It’s not that liberalism has disappeared; it still exists, and other value systems still exist, but populism has become the dominant value. Therefore, the global anxiety stems from the belief that changes in values will not only alter the U.S. but also potentially change the world.

For instance, the concept of economic security has become globally popular. All major powers have accepted economic security as a priority. Security is now prioritized over development. This shift changes the global value system, making economic security the dominant concept instead of focusing solely on development or striving for cooperative win-win or mutually beneficial outcomes. Countries begin to strive not for absolute gains but relative gains—either I gain more than you or lose less than you. This changes the fundamental way of thinking.

Regarding China, in the economic and technological fields, conflicts between China and the U.S. will be significant. Trump’s administration might exacerbate these conflicts. However, in the political and ideological realms, the situation might not be as severe as during Biden’s period. Why? Because Trump is a populist, the most pronounced conflict during his tenure is not between liberalism and socialism but between populism and liberalism. As populism mainly targets liberal political figures, Therefore, the ideological conflicts between China, the U.S. might not escalate as severely as in the economic and technological areas.

However, the impact of populism is likely to have significant social effects. There are two layers to the China-U.S. relationship: one is the relationship between the official governments of China and the U.S., and the other is the relationship between the general populations of the two countries. Historically, even when governmental relations between China and the U.S. were tense, grassroots social relations remained relatively stable and were less affected. This is why improving Sino-U.S. relations often starts with people-to-people exchanges. Both sides prioritize fostering these exchanges because they are stable. However, with the rise of populism, social relations between China and the U.S. might deteriorate because populism fosters strong xenophobic sentiments, an exclusionary mentality, and a desire to cut off external cooperation. Populists believe that all domestic problems originate from abroad, and any connection with external entities brings trouble. The rise of populist values will likely result in both governmental efforts and social relationships being strained. Recent reports show that the University of Michigan has stopped cooperation with Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Berkeley has ceased collaboration with Tsinghua University, and Georgia Tech has halted cooperation with the Southwest University of Technology. The reason is that Congress stated these collaborations harm the U.S. and pose security threats. I predict that when Trump takes office again, Chinese student visa approvals will decrease once more, reversing the trend of recovery and increase seen during Biden’s administration. Therefore, the rise of populist values in the U.S. and their global spread will lead to worsening people-to-people relations between China and the U.S. This is my view: not only will governmental relations suffer, but social relations will also face significant damage.

When Trump takes office, he will likely accelerate economic deglobalization, leading to further fragmentation of international markets. Originally, globalization was moving towards a unified global market, but now there's a trend towards deglobalization and market fragmentation. Trump's administration will exacerbate this trend by adopting protectionist trade policies to protect the U.S. market.

If the world's largest economy adopts measures prioritizing domestic consumption, other countries will likely follow suit, protecting their own markets first before allowing foreign products. This rise in trade protectionism leads to reciprocal retaliatory measures: if one country imposes tariffs, the other does too.

With regard to Biden’s “small yard high fence“ approach, I believe some of Trump’s policies may not entirely differ from Biden’s. In certain aspects, Trump might continue some of Biden’s approaches, especially in China policy. Trump will likely inherit Biden’s China policy and push it to the extreme. The intensity of opposition will increase. Trump might even view Biden’s approach as insufficiently secure and believe that the safest approach is to fully domesticate the supply chain, which would be even more secure than the “high walls” policy.

The third impact might be on the diplomatic strategies of major powers. Since the end of the Cold War, major powers have increasingly emphasized cooperating as much as possible in areas where collaboration is feasible, especially in the economic field, believing that such cooperation doesn't harm anyone. One thing everyone agrees on is that we can no longer engage in the old-style territorial expansion and power politics. In other words, it's acceptable to go to war, but the purpose of the war must be political rather than territorial.

But now, a new trend has emerged where the principle of sovereignty seems less stringent, and the purpose of war appears to be territorial conquest. Comparing the Syrian and Iraq wars, the Iraq war, in which Saudi Arabia also participated, but it didn’t seize Iraqi land for itself. However, in the Syrian conflict, Turkey took control of the northern region after the war, and Israel seized parts of Eastern Syria. Wars now are about occupying territory. Trump has stated that he also wants to occupy territory, whether he will actually do so is uncertain, but saying it out loud confirms his intentions. In the past, such thoughts were considered politically incorrect, but now they are no longer deemed politically incorrect. After Trump takes office, major powers' diplomatic policies will increasingly revert to power-based choices, meaning more reliance on violent means to resolve territorial disputes. This is an unfavorable development trend.

I don’t think there will be another world war. After all, we are now in the nuclear era. Nuclear weapons can prevent both the post-nuclear Cold War era and a new world war. I believe that as long as new technologies do not render nuclear weapons ineffective, they will continue to serve as a deterrent against direct wars between nuclear-armed states.

Currently, major powers adhering to the rule of not using nuclear weapons remains an established norm and mutual understanding. I believe this rule will continue, at least maintaining its role in preventing direct wars between major powers for another ten years. If major powers were to engage in direct war, it would escalate to nuclear war, bringing great danger. If there is a proxy war, moving from proxy conflicts to direct wars requires crossing a significant threshold. This is why, despite NATO and the U.S. providing extensive military support—even secretly deploying some military personnel—they publicly claim non-involvement.

Based on the above, I would like to summarize three points:

1. Deglobalization will intensify but it will not revert to the Cold War era. In other words, the international order we face in the future will neither be the post-Cold War globalization order nor the Cold War order that prevailed for forty years after World War II. Instead, it will be a deglobalization order with its own characteristics, distinct from both globalization and Cold War orders. My view is that major powers will not engage in war with each other; instead, they will only experience localized conflicts in specific areas, unlike the Cold War period when the U.S. and the Soviet Union were engaged in a pervasive cold war worldwide.

2. We are in the digital age. The digital age is characterized by the fact that wealth primarily comes from digital technologies, and the digital economy has become the main source of wealth for major powers. Some argue that the digital economy already accounts for over 50% of the U.S. GDP, while in China, it is said to be close to 40%. The exact figures may vary, but there is no disagreement that the proportion of the digital economy in major powers' GDPs is continuously rising. This means that Trump, under any circumstances, will prioritize technological competition. His China policy will undoubtedly consider how to prevent the technological gap between China and the U.S. from narrowing, which he views as the core issue. Although his strategies may differ from Biden's—for example, Biden might seek to organize a group of countries to exclude China, while Trump might argue that such an approach is unreliable and instead push for bringing production back to the U.S. and establishing a complete domestic industrial chain—the main objective remains to prevent the technological gap between China and the U.S. from closing, which I believe is still central.

3. We are in an age of changes. Everyone, both major and small countries, is aware of these changes and must reform. Strategic competition between major powers has now entered a new competitive field: comparing which country can better adapt to the historical trend of deglobalization through reforms that align with development trends. Successful reforms will enhance a country's strength while failed reforms will lead to decline.

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Part II Q&A

Q: Will there be a war between China and the U.S.?

Wang Jisi: To respond, the possibility of armed conflict still exists and may not be insignificant. However, both sides still impose some self-limitations, which is very important. Both sides are restraining themselves and do not want such crises to occur, even though it would be too easy to provoke them if they wanted to.

I believe there are still many rational factors at play. That is to say, even if armed conflict occurs, both sides might stop quickly.

Yan Xuetong: I believe that armed conflicts between major powers could lead to accidental clashes ("擦枪走火"), but personally, I think these accidental incidents won't escalate into full-scale wars. The possibility of accidental clashes between major powers is increasing. However, as long as major powers are willing, they can prevent these accidental clashes from escalating into wars. Over the years, we've seen countless accidental clashes that did not lead to wars.

From the perspective of war, the competition between China and the U.S. is likely to resemble the Cold War in one aspect. If this competition period lasts 40 years, similar to the Cold War, the early stage will be more tense than the later stage, with more military conflicts occurring in the early phase and fewer in the later phase. Why? As Professor Wang Jisi mentioned earlier, some people in the U.S. are very anxious and want to achieve victory within ten years. To do so, they resort to more extreme measures. If they say, "We can't achieve victory in ten years, let's take our time," the intensity won't be as high. During the Cold War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union wanted to achieve victory within ten years, thinking they could catch up with or surpass the other in that timeframe. However, after twenty years of confrontation and competition, they realized that ten years wasn't enough to resolve such a large-scale global strategic competition. As a result, in the later stages, since they didn't know when it would end, their strategies became relatively milder. So, Professor Wang Jisi's point gives me the insight that the next ten years might be a period of rapidly increasing intense competition, becoming more competitive as time progresses, and then becoming relatively more relaxed after this period.

That poses another question, would conflicts or proxy wars lead to another Cold War?I don't think the competition between China and the U.S., which centers on technology rather than ideological expansion, will lead to a Cold War. The core of the Cold War was expanding one's ideology and political system through proxy wars, winning over more countries, and changing more of them to enhance one's competitive edge. However, China and the U.S. are not trying to expand their ideologies to improve their national digital competitiveness. Proxy wars won't enhance your capabilities or expand your market in the global digital economy. War can't solve these issues. Especially with Trump, it seems he doesn't have as strong an intention to expand ideology globally.

Q: How will Trump’s coming to power impact the multi-lateral mechanism?

Yan Xuetong: Over the past 30 years, under the liberal ideology, many institutions have been established. We are accustomed to them. However, I believe that the effectiveness of these liberal-established institutions is declining. They are increasingly not being seriously followed or enforced by various countries. In my imagination, this trend will lead to new arms races, which have already begun to some extent, especially concerning unmanned weapons systems. In the trade domain, the "Three Zeros" (zero tariffs, zero barriers, zero subsidies) are no longer the focus of consensus-building efforts. On the battlefield, the rules were that civilian infrastructure was not attacked. However, the Gaza conflict has changed this, meaning that future laws of war might not enforce these battlefield rules as strictly as before.

I believe environmental protection might be even more significantly affected. In the past, regardless of circumstances, efforts made by anyone in environmental protection were appreciated. In the future, however, people might no longer view it this way. They might no longer see producing electric cars as a politically correct move but rather as a way to dominate foreign markets. The perception has changed, and it's very likely that the familiar institutions we know will be significantly weakened.

Q: If Trump pursues an isolationist foreign policy, what will it mean for China?

Yan Xuetong: if Trump adopts an isolationist policy focusing on the Americas—specifically South America and the North Pacific—and neglects other regions, this would strengthen the United States' position in the Americas. Conflicts with China in South America and North America would increase, leading to greater conflicts within the U.S. market itself.

If the US withdraws from other regions, it could create many new conflicts and tensions, which would not be favorable for China's economic development.

On the notion that a retreating U.S. would open new opportunities for China, it would depend on if China can grasp those opportunities. If a major power withdraws from a region, you have to ask whether the benefits of their withdrawal outweigh the drawbacks. If they withdraw because the drawbacks are too great, you have to ask if your entry won't bring similar drawbacks. When the previous power withdrew, did it leave more trouble or more opportunities? Therefore, you can’t say whether it’s good or bad that the U.S. enters or withdraws from a region, it requires a case-by-case analysis.

Q: What will the China-Russia-U.S. power structure look like under Trump?

Wang Jisi: Regarding Sino-US-Russia relations, the status quo is that China and Russia are very close, the relationship between China and the US is relatively distant, and the relationship between the US and Russia is even further.

The current situation raises the question: What exactly is the U.S. going to do? As you mentioned earlier, there are indeed people, including some domestically, who think that the U.S. wants to ally with Russia to suppress China. Given that Trump is now taking office, there is a possibility that the relationship between the U.S. and Russia might change. But firstly, can Trump truly represent the entire United States? Does what he says automatically become U.S. policy? I think there is still a significant gap here. Will Trump significantly improve relations with Russia and bring Russia over to his side to fight China? I see absolutely no possibility of that. I don't believe such a scenario is feasible. What the U.S. might do instead is pursue what is called a "double strike" or even "double containment," simultaneously suppressing China and Russia. However, this approach would likely lead to China and Russia further strengthening their relationship, which the U.S. would dislike but cannot change. If the U.S. tries to use China to oppose Russia, it knows it cannot achieve this; similarly, Russia opposing China is also unfeasible. Therefore, I emphasize that the basic structure of Sino-US-Russia relations will remain unchanged, at least in the foreseeable future. China now is in a relatively advantageous and comfortable position. The U.S. may hope that we can distance ourselves a bit from Russia, while Russia certainly hopes to deepen its relationship with China and expects China to take certain actions. I do not see the possibility that Russia and the U.S. would team up against China. I simply do not see it.

Q: How will Trump change the U.S.-Japan-ROK alliance?

Zhang Yuyan: I don’t foresee fundamental changes. There will be some adjustments. For example, the proportion of payment for stationed troops might change because the U.S. has vested interests. Additionally, the U.S. will have higher demands on these countries in other areas. These are things that might cause discomfort for U.S. allies, However, overall, I don’t think the U.S.-Japan alliance or the U.S.-South Korea alliance will change significantly.

Q: Could Elon Musk play a role in shaping China-U.S. relations?

Wang Jisi: I’m not familiar with this person. Some people think he should have a positive impact on Sino-U.S. relations, but the Americans I’ve interacted with don’t necessarily share this view. In other words, Musk collaborates a lot with China, knows Chinese people, and has visited China many times. This is certainly a good thing, as he is a businessman with high-level technological expertise who is now also entering the political arena. However, we cannot equate one person's attitude toward China with the entire U.S. policy. Moreover, as far as I know, he also has a competitive relationship with China. His cars compete with Chinese cars in some way, obviously. Is he planning to invest in Tesla in China long-term, or will he leave after reaping some benefits? The situation I’ve heard about is quite complicated, so I believe we cannot place our hopes for Sino-US relations on one individual.

Yan Xuetong: Regarding whether individuals can influence the international landscape in this era, it is possible only for those who hold power. Trump is an individual who, as the leader of the world's most powerful country, can influence changes in the international situation. For those without power, influencing the international situation is almost impossible.

Q: If this round of strategic competition between China and the U.S. would last decades, how should China prepare itself?

Yan Xuetong: I believe that Sino-U.S. strategic competition began when the U.S. began its “pivot to Asia“. The message was clear, it positioned China as the main strategic competitor, although he did not use the term "rival." This competition has been ongoing for 14 years now. What has been welcoming during these 14 years is that neither side has engaged in proxy wars, which was unimaginable during the U.S.-Soviet competition at the time. We should draw on this successful experience and continue this trend.

Q: How should China cope with deglobalization?

Yan Xuetong: I personally believe that deglobalization began in 2017, making it over seven years now. It started with Brexit—the United Kingdom leaving the European Union, which marked the beginning of deglobalization. The U.S.-China trade war arose because the two largest economies, the US and China, entered into a trade conflict, making the world feel the impact of deglobalization. Over these seven years, China has dealt with two U.S. administrations. Both sides realize during this period internal reforms are decisive. This aligns with the saying, "When a country reforms and its neighbors do not, it can become a hegemon." If you do well and they do poorly, you can thrive; if you do well and they do better, they will still outpace you. So, the emphasis is on developing ourselves, focusing on our own development as the main direction, with diplomacy serving our development.

To continue this line of thinking, I feel China must continue with our path of reform and opening up—the most fundamental political line we have been following since 1978. Persisting with reform and opening up is a principle that can bring us opportunities and enhance our chances of success in competing with the U.S.

This poses a new problem for us. In the past, studies focused on how to reform and open up under globalization, and how to engage in external cooperation under deglobalization.

Q: If Trump were to meet the DPRK leader again, how should Beijing respond?

Yan Xuetong: Trump’s past meetings with the North Korean leader have resolved some crises. From this experience, Trump’s meetings with the North Korean leader are positive for peace on the Korean Peninsula, not negative. Their meetings prove that a large-scale conflict is unlikely. Northeast Asia has been peaceful since the Korean War ended in 1953. This long-lasting peace in Northeast Asia surpasses that of Southeast Asia. If Trump resumes meetings with North Korean leaders, I believe it should be encouraged to maintain the existing long peace.

Q: Is Trump a transactional leader? How should Beijing deal with a transactional figure?

Yan Xuetong: I’m afraid more academic study is needed to determine whether Trump is a transactional leader. Just because he has been in business for many years doesn't necessarily mean he is transactional. Diplomacy between countries is always transactional as it involves negotiations. From a diplomatic perspective, many times it's a process of making deals.

So the question becomes is there room for cooperation between China and the U.S. I believe there is still room for cooperation, such as in managing crises in the Taiwan Strait. Since the Bush era, both China and the US have been managing this region, and no war has broken out. In the previous administration with Trump, we continued the policy of crisis management and maintained peace in the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, this administration could still potentially work with Trump on managing issues in the Taiwan Strait.

Regarding AI, currently, we are negotiating political principles for the development of AI technology with Biden's administration, intending to manage it to prevent harm to all of humanity. That does not change as Trump comes into office so we may continue to discuss AI principles.

In the context of the Ukraine war, ending the war would benefit China. If Trump wants to end the war, we would not take an inconsistent stance against him.

Additionally, on the issue of drugs, China's drug prevention policies are very strict. We have been assisting the U.S. in drug control, and the Ministry of Public Security is still saying they are cooperating with the U.S.

Therefore, even after Trump takes office, there remains a lot of space for cooperation. Many matters require cooperation due to mutual interests; both sides recognize that they cannot avoid cooperation.

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It’s noteworthy that the notice was accompanied by several official releases that sought to clarify the move, including from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MoA), which will conduct the investigation in conjunction with MofCom. On top of that, state news agency Xinhua also releases an interview with an expert at an official institution painting the backdrop of the decision.

These concerted efforts paint a holistic picture of the thinking behind and process leading up to the decision and offer transparency in a move that has international ramifications.

This newsletter will list the official releases in the order they are released, and highlight the most important bits.

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I. The MofCom Notice

On the afternoon of Dec. 27, MofCom releases the notice.

It says on Nov. 22, it received a joint application from 10 industry associations related to beef production calling for an investigation into beef imports. The 10 associations include the China Animal Agriculture Association (CAAA) (a Reuters report seems to have erroneously translated the group into China Animal Husbandry Association) and livestock groups of Jilin, Liaoning, Guizhou, Sichuan, Hebei, Inner Mongolia, Shandong, Henan, and Xinjiang. Except for Guizhou, all other provincial groups represent top-10 beef-producing provinces in China.

The applicants state that

Beef import has sharply increased from 2019 to the first half of 2024. In 2023, it grew by 64.93% compared to 2019, and in the first half of 2024, it grew by 106.28% compared to the first half of 2019. From 2019 to the first half of 2024, imported beef’s share in the Chinese market rose from 20.55% to 30.90%, and the proportion relative to China's total production rose from 24.87% to 43.87%.

The sharp increase in the import quantity of beef has impacted domestic industries in China, causing serious damage to these industries, and there is a causal relationship between the increase in beef import and the severe damage to the domestic industries.

申请调查产品进口数量在2019年至2024年上半年急剧增长。2023年比2019年增长64.93%，2024年上半年比2019年上半年增长106.28%。2019年至2024年上半年，申请调查产品进口数量占中国市场份额由20.55%上升至30.90%，相对于中国总产量的比例由24.87%上升至43.87%。

申请人同时主张，申请调查产品进口数量的急剧增长对中国国内产业造成冲击，中国国内产业受到严重损害，且申请调查产品进口数量的增加与中国国内产业受到的严重损害之间存在因果关系。

MofCom says it has determined that the applicants have submitted sufficient material to warrant a probe that it has decided to launch a requested investigation starting Dec. 27.

The probe will focus on beef products listed under China import tax codes 02011000, 02012000, 02013000, 02021000, 02022000, and 02023000, imported from Jan.1, 2019, to June 30, 2024. Relevant parties may submit their opinions to MofCom and the probe is expected to last 8 months, which may be extended under special conditions.

II. The MofCom Q&A

15 minutes after MofCom put up the notice, it released a Q&A, attributed to a MofCom spokesperson.

In the Q&A, the spokesperson primarily made three points.

First, laying out the background, which largely reiterated evidence submitted by the 10 industry associations.

Second, it provided the legal basis for conducting the investigation, saying such actions are in accordance with Chinese laws and WTO rules. It says:

According to Chinese law and in accordance with WTO rules, in the event of an increase in the number of imported products and serious damage or the threat of serious damage to domestic industries producing similar products or directly competitive products, the investigating authority may, at the request of the domestic industry, initiate a safeguard investigation in order to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the domestic industry.

根据中国法律并遵循世贸组织规则，在进口产品数量增加，并对生产同类产品或者直接竞争产品的国内产业造成严重损害或严重损害威胁的情形下，调查机关可以应国内产业申请发起保障措施调查，维护国内产业的合法权益。

Third, it stressed that the action does not target any country or origin of beef and that normal trade will not be affected for the duration of the probe. Also, China is willing to maintain channels of communication with all relevant parties to resolve the matter in a friendly manner.

In accordance with the law, China's investigating authorities examined the domestic industry's application, found that the conditions for filing a case were met, and decided to initiate a case for investigation. It should be emphasized that safeguard investigations do not target specific countries and regions, do not distinguish between the places of origin of products, and do not affect normal trade during the investigation. The investigating authority will carry out the investigation in accordance with the law, fully safeguard the rights of all stakeholders, and make a judgment objectively and impartially based on the results of the investigation. China is willing to maintain communication with all parties on this case, engage in friendly consultations, accommodate each other's concerns and work together to maintain a healthy and stable international economic and trade environment.

中国调查机关依法对国内产业申请进行审查，认为符合立案条件，决定启动立案调查。需要强调的是，保障措施调查不针对特定国家和地区，不区分产品来源地，调查期间不影响正常贸易。调查机关将依法开展调查，充分保障各利害关系方权利，并根据调查结果客观公正作出裁决。中方愿就此案与各方保持沟通，进行友好磋商，照顾彼此关切，共同维护好健康稳定的国际经贸环境。

III. The CAAA interview

About half an hour after MofCom’s Q&A, China Rural News, a news outlet affiliated with MoA, published an interview with an unnamed CAAA executive, who answered two questions in response to the MofCom decision. Less than 10 minutes after Rural News published the interview, it appeared on the official MoA website. Given that CAAA is also a MoA-affiliated group, there seems to be a high level of coordination within the MoA system to provide detailed background and justification for MofCom’s move.

Below is the English translation of the interview.

Q: What is the overall situation of beef imports in China?

A: In recent years, the living standards of urban and rural residents have continued to improve, and there is a strong demand for beef consumption. Due to the large gap between domestic and foreign beef prices, stimulating beef imports continues to increase. 2013 beef imports were less than 300,000 tons, 2023 has reached 2.74 million tons, an increase of more than 8 times, equivalent to 36.4% of domestic production, beef has become the largest imports of meat products that year. Even as the domestic beef industry is sustaining heavy losses, beef imports have surged in 2024, with 2.6 million tons imported from January to November, up 4.3 percent year-on-year.

问：我国牛肉进口的总体情况是怎样的？

答：近些年，城乡居民生活水平不断提高，对牛肉的消费需求旺盛。由于国内外牛肉价差距大，刺激牛肉进口量持续增加。2013年牛肉进口量还不到30万吨，2023年已达到274万吨，增加了8倍多，相当于国内产量的36.4%，牛肉已经成为当年进口规模最大的肉类产品。在国内产业严重亏损的情况下，2024年以来牛肉进口激增，1—11月进口260万吨，同比增长4.3%。

Q: What is the impact of large-scale beef imports on domestic beef cattle farming?

A: Since June 2023, monthly beef imports have exceeded 200,000 tons for 18 consecutive months, dealing a severe blow to domestic cattle farming. With the domestic beef cattle market already in a deep slump, and most farms operating at a loss, this surge in imported beef has only made matters worse. The most immediate impact is widespread losses among farms, which affects farmers’ incomes. Under pressure from imported beef, domestic prices for both beef and live cattle have dropped sharply; beef prices are at their lowest in nearly five years, while live cattle prices have reached a ten-year low.

Data shows that in November of this year, the average loss per slaughtered beef cattle was over 1,600 yuan, marking eight consecutive months of losses greater than 1,000 yuan per head; more than 65% of farms are currently operating at a loss. Moreover, many farms are financed by loans. With cattle selling at such low prices, these loans cannot be repaid. Even if farmers manage to repay their loans, they are left heavily in debt and often have no choice but to leave the industry.

More seriously, a large number of breeding cows are being sold for slaughter, jeopardizing the security of the cattle industry. Industry insiders report that excessive beef imports have already caused substantial harm to China’s beef cattle sector. Our research in major production areas shows that current calf prices are insufficient to cover the feeding costs of brood cows; in some places, brood cows are being sold by weight at low prices, and many cows with breeding potential are ending up at slaughterhouses. According to monitoring, the current inventory of breeding cows is down more than 3% from its historic high in June 2023, and from January to November this year, the number of newborn calves dropped by over 8%.

Because beef cattle have a long production cycle and low reproductive efficiency, once the foundational breeding-cow capacity undergoes a sharp decline, it can take four to five years to recover. If no immediate measures are taken, the hard-won herd of high-quality brood cows will shrink, undermining the foundation of the beef industry. Therefore, the industry is strongly calling on the government to implement control measures on beef imports in order to protect farmers’ livelihoods and ensure industrial security—an action that is also consistent with WTO rules. The release of MofCom’s announcement helps stabilize expectations within the domestic beef cattle industry.

问：牛肉大量进口，对国内肉牛养殖有何影响？

答：2023年6月以来，进口牛肉连续18个月单月进口量超过20万吨，对国内养牛业冲击十分严重。在国内肉牛养殖行情已经十分低迷，大部分养殖场户处于亏损的情况下，大量进口牛肉的冲击无疑“雪上加霜”。最直接的是造成养殖场户大面积亏损，影响农民收入。在进口牛肉的冲击下，国内牛肉和活牛价格快速下跌，目前牛肉价格已跌到近5年最低，活牛价格更是跌到近10年的最低水平。有数据显示，今年11月份出栏一头肉牛平均亏损1600元以上，连续8个月亏损超过1000元，65%以上的养殖场户处于亏损状态。同时，很多养殖场户都是贷款养牛，牛卖不上价，贷款就没法还，即便勉强还上，也是负债累累，不得不退出这个行业。更严重的是母牛被大量出售屠宰，影响产业安全。行业反映，牛肉过度进口已对我国肉牛产业造成实质性损害。我们在一些主产区调研时发现，目前犊牛价格已经抵不上母牛的饲喂成本，有的地方母牛按斤低价甩卖，不少有繁殖力母牛被送进了屠宰厂。据监测，当前基础母牛存栏量比2023年6月的历史高点下降超过3%，今年1—11月份新生犊牛同比降幅超过8%。肉牛生产周期长、繁殖效率低，一旦基础母牛产能大幅下滑，没有4—5年时间难以恢复。如果不尽快采取措施，好不容易发展起来的优质基础母牛群体将面临萎缩，动摇肉牛产业根基。所以，行业强烈呼吁国家对进口牛肉采取管控措施，保护农民生计和产业安全。这也是符合世贸组织规则的一个措施。这个公告的发布，对国内肉牛产业来讲，起到了稳定预期的作用。

IV. The Xinhua interview

Hours after the MofCom and MoA released their pieces, state news agency Xinhua published an interview with CUPL law professor Shi Xiaoli discussing MofCom’s decision.

On top of repeating previously mentioned points on the pressure of the domestic beef industry and that the action is in accordance with WTO rules, Shi stresses that China has always been “very cautious“ in conducting such investigations.

Shi said that from 1995 to 2024, 55 WTO members have launched investigations, totaling 437, while the investigation on imported beef has only been the third such investigation by China. The previous two are against imported steel in 2002 and imported sugar in 2016 (protective measures were taken after both investigations, see here and here).

Shi also noted that for agriculture products, MofCom and MoA will jointly conduct the probe.

V. The MoA talk show

On Dec. 28, a news outlet affiliated with the MoA aired a talk show featuring a MoA official and an industry expert in cattle breeding.

The show mostly covered the status quo of China’s cattle breeding industry and its challenges.

The guests said production of beef can not meet the increasing demand in China, and that foreign beef often costs less than half of domestic beef. The MoA official said

Imported beef costs about 34 yuan (4.7 USD)/kilo pre-tax, while domestic beef costs 70 yuan (9.6 USD)/kilo. Foreign cattle are often grass-fed, with minimal labor cost. By comparison, there are 7.4 million cattle farms in China, with 6.7 million producing less than 10 cattle/year. Farms that produce more than 50 cattle/year only make up for 37.2% of all production, the lowest among all livestock industries.

VI. The Foreshadows

Low beef prices have hurt domestic cattle farmers for months now. In June, Xinhua published a weighted piece discussing the persisting low price of beef. The piece listed fast-growing imports as one of several reasons contributing to the low price.

In response to the hardships facing cattle farmers, MoA and six other government agencies rolled out a policy to help. Measures include boosting milk and beef consumption, and providing loan support for farms “facing temporary hardships”.

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This newsletter will offer a granular explainer of the newly expanded program, answering practical questions including who can enjoy the policy, how long can travelers stay in China, where foreign travelers can and cannot travel under the program, and some of the recommended places to visit.

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【1】Who is it for?

Passport holders from 54 countries are eligible for the VFT program. They are:

Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Danmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Monaco, Russia, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monte Negro, North Macedonia, Albania, Belarus, Norway, the United States, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Japan, Singapore, Brunei, UAE, and Qatar.

【2】How to enter China under the VFT program?

Passport holders of the above countries can show up at one of any 60 designated ports of entry, and present a) a travel document that is valid for more than 3 months and b) confirmed travel tickets exiting China within 240 hours, and can enjoy VFT entry into China.

That is to say, travelers entering China on this program can stay up to 10 days. (Previously travelers could stay 3 days or 6 days depending on points of entry. Now it’s 10 days wherever you enter)

【3】Which are the 60 points of entry?

1. Beijing Capital Airport (IATA Code: PEK, Beijing)

2. Beijing Daxing Airport (PKX, Beijing)

3. Tianjin Binhai Airport (TSN, Tianjin)

4. Tianjin Seaport (Tianjin)

5. Shijiazhuang Zhengding Airport (SJW, Hebei)

6. Qinhuangdao Seaport (Hebei)

7. Shenyang Taoxian Airport (SHE, Liaoning)

8. Dalian Zhoushuizi Airport (DLC, Liaoning)

9. Dalian Seaport (Liaoning)

10. Shanghai Hongqiao Airport (SHA, Shanghai)

11. Shanghai Pudong Airport (PVG, Shanghai)

12. Shanghai Seaport (Shanghai)

13. Nanjing Lukou Airport (NKG, Jiangsu)

14. Sunan Shuofang Airport* (WUX, Jiangsu)

15. Yangzhou Taizhou Airport* (YTY, Jiangsu)

16. Lianyungang Seaport (Jiangsu)

17. Hangzhou Xiaoshan Airport (HGH, Zhejiang)

18. Ningbo Lishe Airport (NGB, Zhejiang)

19. Wenzhou Longwan Airport* (WNZ, Zhejiang)

20. Yiwu Airport (YIW, Zhejiang)

21. Wenzhou Seaport (Zhejiang)

22. Zhoushan Seaport (Zhejiang)

23. Hefei Xinqiao Airport* (HFE, Anhui)

24. Huangshan Tunxi Airport* (TXN, Anhui)

25. Fuzhou Changle Airport (FOC, Fujian)

26. Xiamen Gaoqi Airport (XMN, Fujian)

27. Quanzhou Jinjiang Airport* (JJN, Fujian)

28. Wuyishan Airport (WUS, Fujian)

29. Xiamen Seaport (Fujian)

30. Jinan Yaoqiang Airport* (TNA, Shandong)

31. Qingdao Jiaodong Airport (TAO, Shandong)

32. Yantai Penglai Airport* (YNT, Shandong)

33. Weihai Dashuibo Airport* (WEH, Shandong)

34. Qingdao Seaport (Shandong)

35. Zhengzhou Xinzheng Airport (CGO, Henan)

36. Wuhan Tianhe Airport (WUH, Hubei)

37. Changsha Huanghua Airport (CSX, Hunan)

38. Zhangjiajie Hehua Airport* (DYG, Hunan)

39. Guangzhou Baiyun Airport (CAN, Guangdong)

40. Shenzhen Bao’an Airport (SZX, Guangdong)

41. Jieyang Chaoshan Airport (SWA, Guangdong)

42. Nansha port (Guangdong)

43. Shekou port (Guangdong)

44. Haikou Meilan Airport* (HAK, Hainan)

45. Sanya Fenghuang Airport* (SYX, Hainan)

46. Chongqing Jiangbei Airport (CKG, Chongqing)

47. Guiyang Longdongbao Airport* (KWE, Guizhou)

48. Xi’an Xianyang Airport (XIY, Shaanxi)

49. Taiyuan Wusu Airport* (TYN, Shanxi)

50. Nanchang Changbei Airport* (KHN, Jiangxi)

51. Nanning Wuxu Airport* (NNG, Guangxi)

52. Guilin Liangjiang Airport (KWL, Guangxi)

53. Beihai Fucheng Airport* (BHY, Guangxi)

54. Beihai Port (Guangxi)

55. Chengdu Shuangliu Airport (CTU, Sichuan)

56. Chengdu Tianfu Airport* (TFU, Sichuan)

57. Kunming Changshui Airport (KMG, Yunnan)

58. Lijiang Sanyi Airport (LJG, Yunnan)

59. Mohan Railway Port (Yunnan)

60. Harbin Taiping Airport (HRB, Heilongjiang).

* 21 Newly added points of entry as of Dec.17.

【4】Where can I go during my stay in the VFT program?

The above map indicates regions that are open to travelers under the VFT program. Provinces (cities) in yellow are fully open, while provinces in red are partially open.

The fully open provinces include: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shandong, Shaanxi*, Henan, Anhui*, Jiangsu, Hubei*, Chongqing, Guizhou*, Hunan, Guangdong, Fujian*, Hainan*, and Zhejiang.

The partially open provinces include: Heilongjiang (Harbin city only), Jiangxi* (Nanchang and Jingdezhen cities only), Shanxi* (Taiyuan and Datong cities only), Sichuan (only the cities of Chengdu, Zigong, Luzhou, Deyang, Suining, Neijiang, Leshan, Yibin, Ya’an, Meishan, Ziyang), Yunnan (only the cities of Kunming, Yuxi, Chuxiong, Honghe, Wenshan, Pu’er, Xishuangbanna, Dali, and Lijiang), Guangxi (only the cities of Nanning*, Liuzhou*, Guilin, Wuzhou*, Beihai, Fangchenggang*, Qinzhou*, Guigang*, Yulin*, Hezhou*, Hechi*, and Laibin*)

* Newly added or newly expanded regions open to VFT travelers as of Dec.17.

A prominent feature of the latest change is that the VFT now allows travelers to "conduct cross-regional travel" within the 10-day limit, basically giving VFT travelers the chance to roam the above yellow provinces and eligible cities in the red provinces freely.

Note that the eligible regions are only applicable to travelers under the VFT program. Travelers entering China on a normal tourist visa or other visa-free arrangements are not confined to the eligible regions under the VFT program.

Passport holders of the following countries can enter China visa-free and stay for up to 30 days. Nationals of these countries don’t need to enter under VFT program. Comparing the below list and countries eligible for the VFT, notable differences include the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Russia, whose nationals may not enter China visa-free but are eligible for the VFT program.

[Group A]

Albania, UAE, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, the Bahamas, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dominica, Ecuador, Fiji, Grenada, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Qatar, Maldives, Mauritius, Serbia, Seychelles, San Marino, Surinam, Thailand, Togo, Singapore, Soloman Islands, Brunei, and Armenia.

[Group B*]

1. France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Malaysia

2. Switzerland, Ireland, Hungary, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg

3. Australia, New Zealand, Poland

4. Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, Slovenia

5. Slovakia, Norway, Finland, Danmark, Iceland, Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein, ROK

6. Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Monte Negro, North Macedonia, Malta, Estonia, Latvia, Japan

   *Until Dec. 31, 2025

【5】What are the hottest tourist spots in regions covered by the VFT?

A good place to start is to check out the UNESCO World Heritage sites in China, including Cultural Heritage sites, Natural Heritage sites, and mixed sites.

In addition, China’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism assigns a rating for each of the country’s tourist spots, ranging from A to AAAAA, based on quality and management factors like ease of transportation links, site safety, cleanliness, etc., and also takes into account the uniqueness and recognition of the sightseeing offers.

Here’s a link to all of China’s AAAAA spots, but a general rule of thumb is the earlier it’s given the prestigious status, the more must-go the site usually is. If your time is limited, focus on the first batch of 66 tourist spots that were given the status in 2007.

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The reason for the interest in He’s meetings is that they are much more frequent than before, raising speculations that the Chinese central government is putting out a signal by holding these meetings.

According to official English readouts of the meetings, some keywords appear quite frequently, such as

▲Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee

▲ Reforms (of the financial sector)

▲ Opening up (better market access)

▲ Welcome (cooperation, investment, etc.)

Below is a list of his recent meetings with foreign finance and investment executives. Other events of He, including with foreign government officials or those focusing on domestic issues, are not included in this list.

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▲Sept. 20 evening, He Lifeng met with Severin Schwan, chairman of the Board of Directors of Roche Group.

He said

China is implementing the reform measures of the third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, promoting high-quality development and high-standard opening up, further relaxing market access, including for biopharmaceuticals, and creating a better business environment.

China's super-large market advantages will certainly provide more and better development opportunities for foreign enterprises.

For his part, Schwan said that as a world-renowned pharmaceutical company, Roche Group is full of confidence in China's economic prospects and business environment, and is willing to continue deepening investment cooperation in China.

▲ Sept. 24, He Lifeng met members of the international advisory committee of China Investment Corporation (CIC).

He said

China will deepen financial system reform, accelerate the establishment of a modern financial system with Chinese characteristics, and promote high-quality development of the financial sector.

▲ Sept. 24, He Lifeng met with Evan Greenberg, executive vice chair of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and the chairman of insurance company Chubb Limited.

He said

China will steadfastly promote high-level opening-up of the financial sector and welcomed Chubb Group to continue actively participating in the development of China's financial market.

the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations is expected to play a more effective role as a bridge and link between the two countries, facilitating exchanges and cooperation among the business communities, and achieving greater mutual benefit and win-win outcomes.

The official readout says members of the international advisory committee of CIC and Greenberg expressed their belief that

further comprehensive and deepened reforms in China will bring new potential and vitality to the country's economy and financial sector. They remain confident in the prospects of China's economy and financial markets.

▲ Oct. 18, He Lifeng met with members of the International Advisory Council of the National Financial Regulatory Administration.

He said

China will further deepen the reform of the financial system, steadily expand the institutional opening up in the financial sector, facilitate cross-border investment and financing, and support more foreign financial institutions and long-term capital to invest and start businesses in China, in order to provide high-quality financial services for China's modernization.

For their part, the advisory council members expressed their anticipation for the financial reform and opening up, and the development prospect of China's economy and financial market.

▲ Oct. 28, He Lifeng met with Ben Keswick, executive chairman of Jardine Matheson.

He said

Since the beginning of the year, China's economy had maintained a generally stable performance while making progress.

China is deepening its reform and opening up in a comprehensive manner, fostering new quality productive forces and making headway in high-quality development.

We welcome Jardine Matheson and enterprises of various countries to continue deepening cooperation with China to achieve mutual benefits and win-win results.

For his part, Keswick said that Jardine Matheson is optimistic about China's economic prospects and market potential, and expressed the company's willingness to increase its investment in China and expand cooperation.

▲ Nov. 1, He met with an Australian high-level business delegation led by David Olsson, National President of the Australia China Business Council.

He said

China welcomes Australian enterprises to strengthen cooperation with China in trade, investment, finance and other areas.

While China is advancing high-level opening up and further easing market access, it will protect the national treatment and legitimate rights and interests of foreign-funded enterprises.

For their part, representatives of Australian enterprises said that they are optimistic about China's economic prospects and are willing to commit to long-term cooperation with China and promote the sustainable development of bilateral economic and trade ties.

▲ Nov. 12, He met with Andrew Schlossberg, President and Chief Executive Officer of Invesco.

He said

China is promoting high-level opening-up in the financial sector and welcomes foreign-invested enterprises to deepen mutually-beneficial cooperation.

China is continuing to deepen the reform of the capital market, steadily expanding the institutional opening up of the financial sector, and striving to provide high-quality financial services for economic and social development. Companies from all countries are welcome to continue deepening investment cooperation with China for mutual benefit and win-win results.

For his part, Schlossberg expressed his optimism about the development prospects of China's financial market, saying his company is willing to take China's further comprehensive deepening of reform as an opportunity to continue expanding cooperation with China.

▲ Nov. 14, He met with HSBC Group Chairman Mark Tucker.

He said

China welcomes more foreign financial institutions and long-term capital to invest and operate in China.

China is making efforts to deepen the reform of its financial system, steadily expand institutional opening-up in its financial sector, and create a transparent, stable and predictable institutional environment, providing greater convenience for foreign enterprises to expand their business in China.

For his part, Tucker said that HSBC Group is confident in the prospects of China's economy and financial market, and will continue to expand its investment in China.

▲ Nov. 21, He met with Jane Fraser, chief executive officer of Citigroup.

He said

China is deepening the reform of its financial system and continuing to expand the high-level, two-way opening-up of its financial sector.

China welcomes more foreign financial institutions and long-term capital, including Citigroup, to invest and do business in China, and to share opportunities and participate in the development of the country's financial market.

For her part, Fraser said that Citigroup is optimistic about the prospects of China's economy and financial market, and is willing to explore the Chinese market further, contributing to the promotion of U.S.-China economic and trade cooperation and maintaining the healthy development of the global economy.

▲ Nov. 27, He met with a delegation from Japan's Kansai business community.

He said

It is hoped that the Kansai business community of Japan will continue to seize China's development opportunities for mutual benefit and win-win results.

Noting China and Japan's deep integration in terms of industrial and supply chains and their broad common interests and cooperation space, He encouraged Japan's Kansai business community to continue to grasp China's development opportunities and deepen practical cooperation for mutual success and win-win outcomes.

For their part, the Leaders of the delegation expressed their appreciation for China's achievements in economic and social development -- and their willingness to contribute more to achieving mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries.

▲ Dec. 3, He met with Frédéric Oudéa, chairman of the board of directors of French pharmaceutical giant Sanofi.

He said

It is hoped that more French and European companies will continue to develop their business operations in China and share its development opportunities.

Economic and trade cooperation between China, France, and the broader European continent has many converging interests and strong complementarities, providing broad space for development.

China is continuously opening up to the outside world at a high level and building a market-oriented, law-based and internationalized business environment.

For his part, Oudéa said that Sanofi Group is optimistic about the prospects of China's economic development and is willing to deepen its presence in the Chinese market and contribute more practical results to the mutually beneficial cooperation between China and France and between China and Europe.

▲ Dec. 4, He met with John Waldron, president and chief operating officer of Goldman Sachs Group.

He said

China is fully implementing the guiding principles of the 20th CPC Central Committee's third plenary session, steadily advancing major measures to deepen comprehensive reform, and continuously expanding opening-up at a high level.

We welcome more U.S. financial institutions and long-term capital, including Goldman Sachs Group, to continue deepening mutually beneficial cooperation with China, and to play a greater role in promoting the healthy development of China-U.S. relations.

For his part, Waldron said the Goldman Sachs Group is full of confidence in China's economy and future development and is willing to continue expanding cooperation with China and making contributions to promoting U.S.-China economic and trade cooperation.

▲ Dec. 5, He met with BlackRock CEO Larry Fink.

He said

China is further deepening the reform of its financial system and steadily expanding the institutional opening up of the financial sector, providing greater convenience for foreign enterprises operating in the country.

China welcomes more foreign financial institutions and long-term capital, including BlackRock, to invest and do business in China, sharing China's development opportunities.

For his part, Fink said that BlackRock is optimistic about the prospects of the development of China's economy and financial market, and is willing to continue to deepen its engagement with the Chinese market and contribute to U.S.-China economic and trade cooperation.

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This newsletter offers a compilation of public-available takes from notable Chinese scholars, to shed light on how China is digesting the election outcome.

Without further ado:

△ Jia Qingguo spoke on the impact of the U.S. presidential election on the China-U.S. relationship recently at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. The following is not a transcript but is paraphrased from his English speech by Lianhe Zaobao.

Jia is a professor at Peking University.

Before Trump came to power in 2016, there were advantages and disadvantages for China if a Republican or a Democrat won the U.S. presidential election. The election of a Republican candidate traditionally meant that the new administration would practice free trade and would put less pressure on China over trade deficits and human rights, but it would also strengthen military alliances against China, provide Taiwan with more security assistance, and directly provoke Chinese sovereignty.

Traditionally China valued continuity in Washington's policies and hoped that the incumbent party would win the election to save a teething phase when a new administration took office. If there is party rotation in the White House and the handover between two presidents is sometimes rushed and incomplete, there could be surprises and sources of friction in the U.S.-China engagement. But the above situation has changed dramatically since Trump took office in 2016, with Republicans no longer supporting free trade and Democrats becoming more proactive on Taiwan.

There are two cautionary points in this U.S. presidential election, one is that Trump could be more unpredictable. The other is that more Republican politicians, especially members of the House, have been more ruthless, provocative and sometimes racist in their policies toward China than Democrats.

Trump’s second term is expected to include more provocations against China over Taiwan, higher trade tariffs on Chinese exports to the United States, doubling down on the “small yard, high fence” strategy to restrict high-tech exports, politicizing people-to-people exchanges, and the possibility of sanctions against China over the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

No matter who ends up in the White House, U.S. policy toward China will continue to be tough and even hostile. China must prepare for what may happen by accelerating its military modernization to defend its core interests, developing its economy well, and avoiding involvement in accidental military conflicts in the South China Sea and Taiwan, as well as avoiding unnecessary disputes with the outside world.

China should insist on doing the right thing, including maintaining dialogues and consultations at different levels to find ways to handle differences and protect common interests. At the same time, China should continue to open up to the outside world, promote exchanges between Chinese and foreigners, and build good relations, especially with its immediate Asian neighbors, and cooperate with moderate and pragmatic actors who are friendly to the United States.

朗普2016年上台前，无论共和党还是民主党在美国总统选举中胜选，对中国都各有利弊。共和党候选人当选，传统上意味着新政府将实行自由贸易，在贸易逆差和人权问题上会减少对中国施压，但同时也会加强对华军事联盟，提供台湾更多安全协助，直接挑衅中国主权。

中国早年更看重华盛顿政策的延续性，并希望当政者所属政党胜选，以在新政府上台后省去磨合阶段。如果白宫出现政党轮替，两任总统交接有时仓促且不完整，中美接触就可能出现意外和摩擦源。但上述情况自特朗普2016年执政后出现巨大变化，共和党不再支持自由贸易，民主党在台湾问题上也变得更积极主动。

这届美国总统选举中有两点值得警醒，一方面是特朗普更情绪化、更难以预测。另一方面是与民主党人相比，更多共和党政客尤其众议员的对华政策更无情、具挑衅性，有时还带有种族主义。

因为他第二任内预计会在台湾问题上更多挑衅中国，对中国输美商品加征更高贸易关税，限制高科技出口的“小院高墙”、院墙将变得更大更高，中美人员交流也会更政治化安全化，中国还可能因俄乌冲突问题遭遇制裁。

无论谁最终入主白宫，美国对华政策都将继续强硬甚至敌对。中国必须为可能发生的一切做好准备，加快军事现代化捍卫核心利益，发展好经济，并在南中国海、台湾等地避免卷入偶发军事冲突，同时避免与外界产生不必要的争端。

中国应坚持做对的事，包括保持不同层次的对话和磋商，找到处理分歧和保护共同利益的方法。中国同时应持续对外开放，促进中外人员交流，并尤其与亚洲近邻建立良好关系，与友美温和务实者合作。

△ Wu Xinbo, as interviewed by Jiemian News

Wu is a professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University.

A re-elected Trump will “walk the talk” on imposing tariffs on imports. Tariffs are not just a negotiating tool for Trump, but also an ideology that Trump believes is good for the U.S. and an effective economic policy tool.

Whether the tariffs on Chinese goods will reach 60 percent will vary depending on the specific types of goods. Duty on goods that the U.S. must import from China may not hit 60%.

In addition to Trump himself, the “extreme hawks” on China in the new Trump administration will not only push for decoupling from China economically but also intensify confrontation with China on security issues, including Taiwan.

As a result, China-U.S. relations will fluctuate dramatically in the next four years, with escalating tensions, intensifying confrontation, and perhaps even a major crisis. The space for China-U.S. cooperation will be drastically compressed after Trump's administration, and the topics of cooperation will shrink, such as jointly tackling climate change.

The United States still needs China's cooperation on drug control. Compared to the Biden administration, the cooperation component of the U.S.-China relationship under Trump will be significantly reduced, and the positive effect of cooperation on bilateral relations will be very, very limited.

Another change with Trump's return will be a decline in engagement between the U.S. and China, both at the official level and in the private sector. “Extreme hawks” in the Trump administration have also advocated a reduction in diplomatic engagement with China and a decrease in social exchanges between the two countries.

When Trump takes office, even if the Democrats take the House of Representatives, it won't have much of an impact on China policy. The Democrats will pressure Trump on domestic issues when they take control of the House, but on tariffs against China, the Democrats are also generally in favor of tariff increases, so there won't be much of a hold on Trump.

With Trump's increased support for Israel, there is also the potential for further escalation of the conflict in the Middle East after he returns to the White House.

Harris has lost the election mainly because of economic and immigration policies. High inflation and high interest rates during the Biden administration, coupled with the influx of about 10 million illegal immigrants along the U.S.-Mexico border since he took office has sparked discontent among U.S. voters. Harris, who was Biden's deputy, was originally at a disadvantage on these two issues of greatest concern to voters, but she has failed to offer clear and effective solutions, while Trump has proposed tax cuts that are popular with voters.

如果特朗普再次当选，对进口商品加征关税将“说到做到”。加征关税对特朗普而言不仅仅是谈判手段，还是其相信的理念，特朗普认为加征关税对美国有利并且是有效的经济政策手段。

对中国商品征收的关税会不会达到60%，要取决于美国从中国进口商品的具体种类，美国必须从中国进口商品的征税可能不会这么高。

除了特朗普本人，特朗普新政府中的对华极端鹰派不仅会在经济上推动与中国脱钩，还会在安全问题上加剧与中国的对抗，包括中国台湾问题。

“这样一来，中美关系在今后4年会出现大幅度波动，紧张升级、对抗加剧，甚至可能会出现重大危机。”特朗普执政后中美合作的空间将大幅压缩，合作议题将缩水，比如共同应对气候变化。特朗普是气候变化怀疑论者，曾带美国退出巴黎气候协定。

在美国的毒品管控、芬太尼问题上，美国依然需要中国的合作。总体来看相比拜登政府，特朗普再次执政后中美关系中的合作成分将大幅减少，合作对双边关系的正面作用也会“非常非常有限”。

特朗普回归的另一个变化是中美两国之间的交往，无论是官方层面还是民间都会下降。特朗普政府中的极端鹰派也主张在外交上减少与中国接触，降低两国在社会层面的交流。

特朗普上台时，即便民主党拿下众议院，在对华政策上也不会产生太大影响。民主党控制众议院后会在内政问题上向特朗普施压，但在对华关税上，民主党总体也支持加征关税，因此“不会对特朗普有太多牵制”。

由于特朗普对以色列的支持更加没有底线，他如果重返白宫，中东的冲突还有可能进一步升级。

哈里斯在民调中之所以没能保持住领先势头，主要是因为经济和移民政策。拜登执政时期的高通胀和高利率，再加上其上任以来美墨边境有约1000万非法移民涌入引发了美国选民不满。在这两个选民最关注的议题上，作为拜登副手的哈里斯原本就处于不利地位，但她没有提出明确有效的解决方案，特朗普则提出了受选民们欢迎的减税。

△ Liu Weidong, as interviewed by Jiemian News

Liu is a fellow at the Insitute of American Studies, CASS

In his early days, Trump may exert overwhelming pressure on China, and then start to bargain. He will assess what goods can be increased by 60% of the tax, and what goods can not.”

The 2024 Republican Party platform was formulated around Trump, so it's very likely that he'll follow some of those elements to fulfill his promises. In response to Project 2025, while Trump has vigorously denied any connection, that doesn't mean he won't adopt parts of it.

Trump's initial focus after taking office will still be on domestic issues, and the vast majority of the Republican Party platform is about U.S. domestic issues. Pressure on China may not be his focus, but he will certainly do some things as well.

In terms of pressuring China, Trump's perception of the U.S.-China relationship focuses mainly on the economic and trade sphere, so the first moves he will take when he comes to power may include canceling China's most favored nation status, imposing a 60 percent tariff, and imposing higher tariffs on electric cars that Chinese companies manufacture in Mexico and then export to the United States.

On the global fight against climate change, Trump could take the U.S. out of the Paris climate agreement again, stop government funding for new energy use, and renew support for oil and gas resource extraction on his first day in office. He would take immediate action on the issue as a signature move to fulfill his promises to conservatives just after taking office.

The reason Harris lost is because she has not seized the momentum of a good start, been forthright and clear about her policy positions, and has been ambiguous on many issues, Harris' only focus is on defeating Trump, but that's not what voters are most concerned about.

特朗普在执政初期可能给中国一个“泰山压顶”式的施压，之后再开始开条件，“他会评估什么商品能加60%的税，什么商品不能。”

2024共和党纲领就是围绕特朗普制定的，“所以他很有可能会按照其中的一些内容来兑现自己的承诺。”针对“2025计划”，虽然特朗普极力否认与该计划之间的关系，但并不意味着他不会采用其中的部分内容。

特朗普上台后初期的重点依然会放在国内议题上，共和党纲领中绝大部分内容都是关于美国内政议题。“对华施压可能不是他的重点，但他一定也会做一些事情。”

在对华施压上，特朗普对于中美关系的认知主要聚焦在经贸领域，因此他上台后首先采取的举措可能包括取消中国的最惠国待遇、征收60%关税、对中企在墨西哥生产再向美国出口的电动车加征更高关税。

如果特朗普上台，他大概率将兑现承诺，用停止美国对乌克兰武器出口或者其他方式迫使乌克兰接受停火。

在全球应对气候变化上，特朗普上台后可能会在第一天就带美国再次退出巴黎气候协定、停止对新能源使用的政府资助、重新支持油气资源开采。

“他会在刚刚上任的阶段就立刻采取行动，把该问题作为对保守派兑现承诺的一个标志性举措。”

哈里斯优势不再的原因在于没有抓住开局良好的势头、坦率明确自己的政策立场，在很多问题上模棱两可，“哈里斯唯一关注的是击败特朗普，但这并不是选民最关注的问题。”

△ Wang Dong, as interviewed by China Review News

Wang is a professor at Peking University

Overall, “Trump 2.0” is likely to be more destructive than the 2017 version. Compared with his first administration, the views of Trump have not changed much, but the domestic situation and international environment in the United States have changed dramatically, and Trump's understanding of how to utilize the executive power of the presidency has conceivably change as well.

Compared with the time during Trump’s first administration, the United States now faces an environment of intensifying strategic competition among major powers, multiple wars in more regions, and an increasingly fragile so-called U.S.-led “liberal international order”. It is widely recognized that Trump's own emotional, erratic, and rule-ignoring traits mean that “Trump 2.0” will bring about a more unilateralism, populism, “America First”, and a more aggressive U.S. in the international arena.

In the “Trump 2.0” period, China and the United States are likely to be in constant friction and conflict and even enter a phase of high winds and waves. If Trump wins the election, the future is bound to raise the flag of trade protectionism, re-launch the trade war, push the U.S. and China to fully decouple the economy, limit the rise of China in the field of high-tech, and the international trade system will be seriously damaged and weakened, the World Trade Organization and multilateral agreements will face new challenges. These policies will force the reorganization of the global supply chain, leading to further decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies, increasing market uncertainty and volatility, and thus exerting greater pressure on global economic growth.

During the first Trump administration, the U.S. constantly provoked and played with fire on the issue of Taiwan, sending many wrong signals to Taiwan’s “independence forces”. The Trump administration has gradually and substantially departed from the “one China” policy that has been adhered to by successive U.S. administrations since the normalization of U.S.-China relations, and the political foundation of U.S.-China relations has been weakened considerably as a result. The Biden administration has repeatedly declared publicly that the United States wants to return to the “one-China” policy, and its senior officials have openly stated that they do not support “Taiwan independence,” but in reality, the United States is still “hollowing out” the “one-China” policy. As Biden enters the final days of his administration, it is clear that the Biden administration hopes that the overall China-US relationship will be stable and that there will be a smooth transition to the next administration.

At the end of August this year, the U.S. and China held a round of strategic dialogue and the Taiwan question was a core concern mentioned by the Chinese side. In his meeting with Sullivan, Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointed out that Taiwan belongs to China and that China is bound to reunify. Sullivan said in the meeting that the U.S. adheres to the One China policy and does not support “Taiwan independence”, “two Chinas”, or “one China, one Taiwan”. Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointed out that “Taiwan independence” is the biggest risk to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

We need to tell the Taiwan authorities to give up the illusion of “Taiwan independence” and, at the same time, continue to engage in serious strategic dialogues with the United States, requesting the United States to live up to its commitment, stop saying one thing and doing another, stop arming “Taiwan independence”, and support the Chinese side in accomplishing the reunification by peaceful means.

总的来说，“特朗普2.0版”有可能比2017年的版本更具破坏力。与2017年首次执政相比，2024年参与第二次竞选的特朗普的观点并没有太大变化，然而他所处的美国国内形势与国际环境却发生了巨大的变化，可想而知，特朗普对如何利用总统行政权力的理解也会发生变化。与他首次执政时期相比，目前美国面临的环境是愈演愈烈的大国战略竞争、更多区域的多场战争以及日渐脆弱的所谓美国主导下的“自由国际秩序”。普遍公认的特朗普本身情绪化、反复无常、无视规则等性格特点，意味着“特朗普2.0版”将带来一个更加推崇单边主义、民粹主义、“美国优先”、在国际舞台更加咄咄逼人的美国。

在“特朗普2.0版”时期，中美很可能将会摩擦冲突不断，甚至进入风高浪急的阶段。特朗普如胜选，未来势必举起贸易保护主义大旗，重新发动贸易战，推动中美经济全面脱钩，限制中国在高科技领域的崛起，而国际贸易体系也将受到严重破坏和削弱，世界贸易组织以及多边协定将会面临新的挑战。这些政策会迫使全球供应链重组，导致中美经济的进一步脱钩，增加市场的不确定性和波动性，从而对全球的经济增长造成更大的压力。

在特朗普时期，美国在台湾问题上不断挑衅玩火，对“台独”势力发出很多错误信号。特朗普政府事实上已经逐步实质性地背离了中美关系正常化以来历届美国政府均遵守的“一个中国”政策，中美两国关系的政治基础也因之受到很大削弱。而在拜登时期，拜登政府曾多次公开宣示美国要回到“一个中国”政策，其高级官员公开表态不支持“台独”，但实际上美国仍在不断“掏空”“一个中国”政策。在拜登进入执政尾期之时，拜登政府显然希望中美关系整体是稳定的，可以顺利过渡到下一任政府。今年8月底，中美举行了新一轮的战略沟通，台湾问题是中方提及的核心关切。王毅外长在与沙利文的会晤中，指出台湾属于中国，中国必将统一。沙利文在会晤中表示，美方坚持一个中国政策，不支持“台湾独立”、不支持“两个中国”、不支援“一中一台”。王毅外长指出，“台独”是台海和平稳定的最大风险。

我们需要正告台湾当局要放弃“台独”幻想，同时面对美方，继续进行严肃的战略对话，要求美方落实自己的表态，停止表面说一套，背后做一套，终止武装“台独”动作，支持中方以和平方式完成统一。

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Why is that an important question? Let me back up a little.

The United States enacted the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) in late 2021 which created an entity list that includes Chinese companies that the United States believes violated the UFLPA. Once included in the entity list, the Chinese company would be banned from exporting its goods to the United States.

The entity list included a section called “A list of entities working with the government of Xinjiang to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor or receive forced labor or Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or members of other persecuted groups out of Xinjiang”. In practice, any Chinese company that is found to have received government-organized transferred labor from Xinjiang is penalized.

The companies say the penalty is unfair, and some are filing lawsuits, demanding removal from the sanctions list.

So, who is right on this? After months of research, I’ve come to believe that at present, government-organized labor transfer programs participated by minority ethnic groups in Xinjiang (including Uygurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz), should not be equated to forced labor and that the United States government should not indiscriminately penalize Chinese companies that receive organized Xinjiang laborers in the name of combating forced labor.

This newsletter will try to offer a holistic introduction to government-organized labor transfer programs in China and Xinjiang in particular. How it started, evolved, was executed, and what result it brought forth.

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I. The beginning of government-organized labor transfer programs in China

Sizeable labor transfer in China, in its broadest sense, has existed ever since the reform and opening when people enjoyed greater freedom of movement. In a natural process of looking for better job opportunities, people moved to more prosperous areas to pursue a better life.

It’s difficult to pinpoint when the government first played a role in the transfer of labor, but it’s likely in the 1980s in the form of grassroots government innovation, rather than a top-down directive that initiated government-organized labor transfer nationwide.

Yours truly got hold of a book published by Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region’s Agriculture Department in 1989 that discussed the region’s labor transfer. It notes in the preface that

据有关部门统计近几年每年输出农村劳动力已初具规模，继续做好工作，力争输出更多农村劳动力。

According to official statistics, in recent years the export of rural laborers has become sizable. [We should] Continue to improve the work, strive to export more rural laborers.

and that it is the opinion of the department that

从长远考虑，要积极创造条件，采取各种形式把农业剩余劳动力最大限度地转移到非农业部门；对易地转移劳动力更有计划有组织地进行，促进农村商品经济发展，振兴宁夏经济。

Taking the long view, [we should] actively create conditions and use various means to transfer surplus agricultural labor to the non-agricultural sector to the maximum extent possible; The cross-region transfer of labor should be carried out in a more planned and organized manner, to promote the development of the rural economy and to vitalize the economy of Ningxia.

Incidentally, in 2021 a hit TV series Minning Town (《山海情》) dramatized a (real-life) 1990s government-backed initiative to alleviate poverty in Ningxia, including programs to have laborers in Ningxia work in Fujian province and Fujian experts assisting Ningxia in upgrading its agriculture.

Similar stories took place in practically all underdeveloped regions, particularly Western provinces, such as Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Gansu, and Qinghai, and over time, the practice becomes more mature and is used by various local governments to alleviate poverty in their regions.

That is to say that from its origin, government-organized transfer of labor was not targeted at any ethnic group, religious minority group, or any specific region, but appeared and widely accepted as an effective method to combat poverty.

Based on numerous academic research, the government's attitude toward labor transfer took a course of change, beginning with discouraging, to acknowledging, approving, encouraging, and finally organizing.

Why the change in attitude? On a macro level, the role of various levels of government in China changed drastically after the reform and opening, and growing the economy has become the utmost imperative, and transferring labor to where there are jobs is crucial to raising income levels.

On a technical level, the unorganized labor migration is viewed as slow and often ineffective. In practice, rural dwellers often only venture to more prosperous regions when someone in their village or family has done so and become successful, but this sort of “chain migration” can only inspire a limited number of rural laborers to resettle. On the other hand, government-endorsed or organized programs could have a much wider reach.

In addition, unorganized laborers face much higher risks due to their unfamiliarity with a strange city or region. They could fail to find a suitable job, be scammed, cheated by dishonest employers, run into legal disputes, and in some cases hit language barriers or face various discrimination. Government-organized labor transfer program solves all of these problems. They could be seen as a training wheel that allows these laborers to familiarize themselves with the more developed regions in a safe setting, or these programs could be viewed as a sort of collective that safeguards the interest of the laborers.

II Purpose of labor transfer

After decades of practice, the transfer of labor, part of which is government-organized, has proven to be a success story in China’s development. It is instrumental in helping China eliminate absolute poverty in 2021 and contributes to shrinking the development gap between various regions in China.

The purpose of these labor transfer programs is primarily to lift people out of poverty, this has not only been stated in official documents but also in all academic research that examined labor transfer-related policies or practices approach the issue from a socio-economic point of view.

To be sure, there is a small minority of research that drew a link between labor transfer programs and enhanced social security, especially in some border regions, but the logic is still an economic one: social security can be achieved when local people lead more prosperous lives thanks to the participation of labor transfer programs.

There are also other un-monetary benefits gained through labor-transfer programs, such as improved women’s rights and a greater emphasis on education. This newsletter will expand a bit on these secondary benefits later.

III Labor transfers in Xinjiang

Labor transfer in Xinjiang underwent three phases.

•Before 1992, strict regulations severely undermined the transfer of rural laborers.

*Despite policy barriers, many Uygurs have started to trickle into Eastern provinces to start businesses. Small Xinjiang communities began to emerge in Beijing in the 1980s and gradually grew in the 1990s. Many Xinjiang people ran restaurants or pushed food carts selling Xinjiang-styled food such as meat skewers. In the 1986 Spring Festival Gala, Chinese comedian Chen Peisi depicted a food vendor pretending to be Uygur in a skit, demonstrating that Uygurs have gained an image as food vendors in the East by 1986.

•From 1993-2002, the government rolled out a series of policies to “approve and encourage the cross-region movement of labor and the exportation of labor from impoverished areas”.

*It’s worth noting that during this period, while policies regulating the transfer of labor gradually relaxed, the movement of labor was primarily within Xinjiang. The Xinjiang government was still wary of the negative effects of outgoing labor. In a 2000 document, the Xinjiang government explicitly warned that “Those who went out to work but couldn’t find a job should be persuaded to return; Those who went out because of the hardship of life should be assisted to overcome difficulties……This way, the outflow of labor would be reduced.”

A 2000 study by the National Bureau of Statistics showed that between 1993 and 2002, Xinjiang practically had almost no export of labor, but had a net import of labor from Henan, Sichuan, and Gansu provinces.

•From 2003 onwards, Xinjiang saw large-scale transfer of labor. Organized labor export to other provinces started in the second half of 2006. In 2009 and 2010, government-led labor transfer to other provinces continues to grow.

*In 2003, the State Council issued a directive on better facilitating rural labor migrating to urban areas to find work (《关于做好农民工进程务工就业管理和服务工作的通知》), and in Jan. 2004, Xinjiang set up a leadership group to spearhead the labor transfer process.

It should be noted that due to the sheer size of Xinjiang, various local governments devised different mechanisms and played varying roles in facilitating labor transfer.

For example, according to one labor transfer study focusing on Moyu County, Hotan Region published in 2013, various local governments in Xinjiang exchange labor demand information in an internal bulletin, and township officials would then relay the information to villages. This mechanism operates with the principle of “voluntary, non-arbitrary, come and go as one wish“, and mainly serves seasonal agricultural labor demand within Xinjiang.

Another mechanism is called a “labor association“and is operated under the umbrella of a village party branch in Moyu. This particular labor association was set up in 2009 and absorbed more than 1400 members. The association would extract an annual membership fee of 6 yuan (in reality covered by a few local business owners), and facilitate its members to work in other provinces. This village association has chapters in the Xinjiang cities of Urumqi, Korla, and Alar, as well as Sichuan and Hubei. The association provides basic relief for family members of its members in times of emergency, and legal support for its members.

The transfer of labor in Xinjiang shares some similar traits with other regions, but its distinctive geographical, ethnic, and custom features present unique challenges to the transfer of labor.

In discussing these challenges, this newsletter will focus especially on Southern Xinjiang (南疆), which is the most impoverished, Uygur-concentrated, and resource-scarce region in Xinjiang.

1. Lack of education. Southern Xinjiang has a lower education level than the national average, meaning that fewer people hold degrees of secondary education. One 2018 publication says the illiteracy rate in Southern Xinjiang is in the double digits, and that college degree holders only make up 2.4% of the population. Most of the population commands little to no Mandarin. Being a traditional farming region, most people in Southern Xinjiang lack the professional skills to work in other fields, limiting their ability to find jobs other than gastronomy, trading Xinjiang products, and simple labor.

2. Conservative mentality. Due to religious and cultural traditions, communities in Southern Xinjiang are observed to be conservative. Some are reluctant to leave their home to work in a non-Muslim region; some may feel that the fate of man is ultimately decided by a deity and it’s not man’s purpose to strive for a better life; some hold the opinion that women should tend to house chores and not work in a public space.

3. Reliance on state subsidies. One research found that some expect the state to offer assistance to their village or region, and do not believe they ought to leave their village to find jobs.

4. Isolated violent incidents have created mistrust and stigma against Uygur workers in other provinces.

5. Due to strict land regulations, leasing farmland to others is difficult. This leads to some farmers dividing their time between farmwork and seeking jobs elsewhere.

All of these hurdles call for government involvement. During earlier years, Xinjiang government involvement mainly took form in three ways, providing language/skill training, optimizing regulations and policies to foster a more labor transfer-friendly environment, and direct monetary support, such as tax deductions for businesses that hire transferred labor.

Now governments are pressured to find more job opportunities for their residents in Eastern provinces, many often rely on “pairing assistance“ partners. According to one expert yours truly interviewed in Urumqi, tracking down suitable jobs is the duty of prefecture-level governments. After they secure the jobs, they distribute the slots to counties and then townships and villages.

The expert reflects that it’s often difficult for the prefecture government to secure jobs in Eastern provinces since their Xinjiang laborers sometimes do not meet the skill requirements of manufacturing plants, and businesses are reluctant to take on the additional cost to accommodate Xinjiang worker’s ethnic or religious needs, such as operating a canteen to serve halal food.

This is where the “pairing assistance“ program comes in, each prefecture would have a partner city in the East that in theory should bear the responsibility of receiving Xinjiang laborers, and there’s a great number of public reports on labor transfer cooperation inked under this mechanism.

The expert notes that in general the job opportunities afforded by these labor transfer programs do not meet the demand for work. However, there are some cases where some villagers are reluctant to participate for reasons such as the belief that women should not leave home to work, and the local officials may try to persuade them.

The expert says in the complicated reality of grassroots, it can’t be ruled out that some local officials may appear to be rough or even issue verbal threats, but he says such actions are a matter of working method of individuals, rather than systematic. Most importantly, the expert says the officials have no real means to follow through on the threats.

The expert’s observation is collaborated with empirical research by a 2022 publication. The research interviewed a random sample of 510 laborers from Southern Xinjiang, the result showed that 455, or almost 90% of the respondents, said they were willing to be transferred out of their home region for a job.

The research also found that both genders expressed similar willingness to participate in labor transfer programs. If you recall that it was mentioned above that in Southern Xinjiang there’s a belief that women should not leave the household, this research shows that this belief does not represent the true attitude of women, but instead the reflection of patriarchal power.

Perhaps counterintuitively, the research indicated that 92 % of ethnic minority laborers welcomed labor transfer programs, while only 84% of the Han laborers felt the same. The study also showed that those who have accepted Mandarin or other forms of training are more accepting of labor transfer programs.

In another related research focusing on participants of labor transfer programs published by Jinan University in 2021, 70 Xinjiang ethnic minority workers in Guangdong were interviewed. All interviewees said they came to Guangdong voluntarily, but their motivations varied.

15% said they are attracted by the natural and social environment, 36% pointed to high income, 24% said encouragement and support by family and friends, 13% said better education resources, 8% said it’s an opportunity to learn Mandarin and working skills, and 5% say they are here to broaden their horizon.

The research discovered that Xinjiang workers in the Eastern provinces are a close-knit group and actively share information among themselves regarding work demands. It’s common for a Xinjiang worker to introduce family or friends to work in the same factory if working conditions and pay are reasonable.

The Xinjiang expert mentioned above says, participants of the government-organized labor transfers to Eastern provinces usually sign contracts lasting 1-3 years. Normally the workers would return home each year for vacation, sometimes the fare paid for by their employers. The experts say most workers choose to return home after their contracts are complete, and the employer typically agrees to keep those who hope to stay on its payroll.

IV Benefits of the labor transfer programs: expected and unexpected

First and foremost, the transfer of labor greatly contributed to the economic well-being of families in Xinjiang, particularly Southern Xinjiang.

According to Xinjiang official figures, income created by transferred labor reached 13 billion Yuan in 2013, compared with just 1.3 billion yuan in 2004. In 2004, 1 million person-times participated in labor transfer, while 2.72 million person-times participated in 2013.

Another set of data that offers a more microscopic view of three populous counties in Southern Xinjiang, Moyu, Shufu, and Shule reveals the same picture.

From 2008 to 2011, the combined income of transferred labor of the three counties doubled from 0.4 billion yuan to 0.84 billion yuan. In 2011, income from transferred labor made up 29.5%, 44%, and 18.3% of the personal income of the three counties respectively.

Another set of figures looks at the per capita disposable income of rural residents of five Southern Xinjiang prefectures from 2008 to 2017.

Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture: from 5,800 to 16,337 (Yuan)

Aksu Prefecture: From 4,313 to 10,982

Kizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture: From 1,695 to 6,524

Kashgar Prefecture: From 2,870 to 8,013

Hotan Prefecture: From 2,226 to 7,441

Labor transfer programs are one of the main reasons contributing to the rapid growth of personal income in these regions.

In the Jinan University report mentioned earlier, researchers found that the 474 Xinjiang ethnic minority workers who were employed by the 5 studied Guangdong companies earned a monthly wage of between 4500 and 5500 yuan, the average being 5010 yuan. That is to say, these workers earned between 49500 yuan and 71500 yuan per year, with an average of 55110 yuan.

According to 2019 figures, Xinjiang's per capita disposable income is 23,103 yuan (34554 yuan for urban residents and 13122 yuan for rural residents). This set of data shows that workers who participated in labor transfer programs earned a significantly higher income than the Xinjiang average.

Participating in labor transfer also offers Xinjiang people to experience a different way of life. Here, yours truly believes personal stories included in the Jinan University report can best illustrate that unique experience.

Interviewee 41 (Kazakh): “After arriving here, I came to realize that the world is so big and has developed so much. I thought to myself when I first came here, my first 30 years of life was wasted. I haven’t seen anything, and only know of raising sheep. Sheep raising is really a matter of luck, good luck in the spring will mean more lambs. Bad luck on the other hand can be life-costing.”

受访人41（哈萨克族）：“到这以后才知道原来世界这么大，已经发达成这样了，我刚来的时候就说呢，自己过去三十年白活了，什么都没见过，就只会放羊，以前放羊么说实话就是看运气的事，运气好了春天就多些羊羔，运气差的话转场死人也不是没可能。”

Interviewee 42 (Uygur): “Our factory is very large, when I first came here, I felt like I was living in a movie. Since I came here, I have seen a lot of foreigners, such as Russians, Indians, and Japanese, and some others I can’t tell where they are from. These people would tour the factory, and it was very interesting for me, because I had only seen foreigners on TV before, and I felt that it was a different world.”

受访人42（维吾尔族）：“我们厂规模很大的，我刚来的时候感觉自己生活在电影里，一来就见到好多外国人，比如俄罗斯的、印度的、日本的还有我说不上的一些国家的人，这些人都会来厂区看，我就很感兴趣嘛，因为以前只在电视上见过外国人，感觉到了不一样的世界。”

Interviewee 43 (Kyrgyz): “I used to herd sheep and never went out of my village, so this opportunity given by the government is a chance for me to come out and see the world. The income from sheep herding is not bad, but after getting used to working in this kind of factory, I don’t want to return to sheep herding. When I herd sheep in the mountains, I would find a stone and huddle beside it to sleep, here the condition is much better.

受访人43（柯尔克孜族）：“我以前就是放羊嘛，从来没出过我们村，政府给的这个机会就成了我出来见见世面的机缘了。放羊收入也还好，但是在这种工厂干习惯了就懒得再去放羊了。在山上放羊，到了晚上就是随便找个石头边儿，裹着衣服就睡了，哪有这么好的条件。”

Interviewee 44 (Kyrgyz): “Not to mention the fact that girls are better at making up and dressing up, and learning how to dress fashionably, even us men pay more attention to our outward appearance. In the past, I used to wear a piece of clothing all the time, anyway, I was like that, the same outfit for two or three weeks, here every day I change, I never wear something two days in a row. Also here I realized that I must work hard, or my contract may not get renewed.”

受访人44（柯尔克孜族）：“别说女生更会化妆打扮了，学着这边的人穿得很时尚，就连我们男的也更注重自己的外在形象了，跟上了时代的进步。以前一件衣服穿上了就一直穿着，反正我就是那样，一件衣服两三个星期，在这里每天都换，穿了一天第二天就不想穿了，一件衣服绝对不会连续穿两天。然后，我发现现在不努力是不行的，一定要努力，不然会被淘汰。”

Interviewee 45 (Kazakh): “For me, the best thing about being over here I think is that the people here are especially humble. Other than making money, we can learn a lot of things here too. We have a lot to learn from them, whether it's working skills or to become a better person, which we can't deny. When I went back (to Xinjiang), someone asked me how it was over here. What I say the most is that people here are very good, they are skillful at work and humble. When we started on the production line under their coaching, when we made a mistake, they won’t blame us, but will treat us with patience.”

受访人45（哈萨克族）：“对我来说，在这边我觉得最好的地方就是这里的人他们特别谦虚，在这儿除了能赚钱，还能学到很多东西，我们要向他们学的东西很多啊，不管是技术上的，还是做人方面的，这些都是我们不能否定的。回去以后如果有人问我内地怎么样，我说的最多的还是这边的人很好，技术很厉害，他们的谦虚和大度更难得，比如生产线上刚开始是他们教我们嘛，我们把一个东西弄错了，他们不会责怪说“你这个是怎么弄的！”，而是像对待自己就的孩子一样，跟你耐心解释。”

Interviewee 46 (Tajik): “When I first came here I thought I was only here to make money. But now I realize just earning money isn’t enough, I need to constantly learn new things on the job. We have a lot of places in the factory that are now using robots, they are doing all the heavy and dangerous work. if you don't learn new technologies or start a business, then the future is not good.”

受访人46（塔吉克族）：“我本来想的来这打工就是为了赚钱么，来了之后发现光赚钱还不行，还得边赚钱边学技术，我们厂子里有好多地方现在都用机器人了，比較重的、危险的活都是机器人在干，要是不去学习新的技术或者有不一样的想法去创业的话以后是发展不好的。”

According to the abovementioned expert, even if the laborers return home after a brief job in the East, they would behave differently from other village folk. They could dress in more modern clothes, bring in new ideas, and gradually influence those around them.

The expert, who has spent years working in Southern Xinjiang, notes that one very important aspect is that through labor transfer programs, the participants become more aware of the spirit of the law and more likely to protect his or her rights with the weapon of law.

Last but not least, labor transfer greatly empowers the women of Southern Xinjiang, promoting gender equality there. This is primarily because in participating in labor transfer programs, men are no longer the sole bread earners of the family and women are finding a voice in households.

Unfortunately, the gender perspective is scattered in various academic research on labor transfer, and yours truly didn’t find research that evaluated labor transfer primarily through the lens of women’s rights.

Below are two first-person accounts of how labor transfer promoted women’s rights.

Interviewee 47 (Uygur female): “Husband-wife relationships have improved since getting here. The wives are more outspoken than before. In our hometown, the women basically don't go out to work, and the men seldom find stable work, and the hours are not as clear as in the factories. When the men came home, they would ask us women 'where you’ve been' and 'what you’ve done' and so on, and they would ask in great detail and very often, and there was much more friction in the lives of the couples. But after getting here, my husband and I are not in the same production line, sometimes we meet for lunch, sometimes we don’t, he doesn’t complain. He also followed the example of his Han Chinese coworkers and started to pay attention to our wedding anniversaries, my birthdays, and so on, and would celebrate these together. Now we have more mutual respect than before.

受访人 47（维吾尔族女）：“到这之后夫妻关系更好了，女的比以前敢说话了。在我们家乡那边女人基本不会出门工作，男人工作也没什么固定的工作，时间没有像工厂这样清楚，男人一回家就会问我们女人‘去了哪里’、‘干了什么’之类的，会问的很详细、很频繁，夫妻之间生活上的摩擦也就多了。但是到这里之后，比如我和我老公不在一个车间，上班说一声就走了，中午吃饭的时间能碰上就一起吃，碰不上就各吃各的，他也不会说什么。到这里就变成，‘你跟我一起工作了’、‘我们在干一样的事情’这种地步。他还学着厂里汉族同志那样，开始上心我们的结婚纪念日啊、我的生日之类的，会一起庆祝这些，夫妻之间也会产生对彼此的尊重。

Interviewee 48 (Uygur male): “After my wife started working, she really changed, she talked and dressed differently, and she did the same work when I did, and sometimes her salary was higher than mine, and she worked very hard. So when she needs something I will buy for her. Before we had little money, the family lived a difficult life, and had no awareness to celebrate anniversaries, birthday, wedding anniversary. I had not been able to celebrate these with her, now I have the means to buy her a gold necklace, a bouquet or a cake.”

受访人48（维吾尔族男）：“妻子开始工作后真的很有变化，说话啊、打扮啊都不一样了，而且我干什么活，她也干什么活，干的时间也都一样，有的时候她工资还比我高，她也很辛苦。所以她有什么需要我都会给她买，以前手上没钱，家里经济困难，也不知道要庆祝这些纪念日什么的，过生日、结婚纪念日这些以前没能为她做过的，现在有条件了，就会送金项链啊、买个花啊、蛋糕啊之类的一起庆祝。”

After speaking to people on the ground, going over academic research, and examining interviews with participants of labor transfer programs, it’s very hard to associate the current practice of labor transfer programs with the nefarious picture of forced labor painted by some.

If anything, I hope this newsletter will at least show that Chinese companies accepting government-organized ethnic workers from Xinjiang deserve the benefit of the doubt before being slapped with a blanket sanction based on the presumption that they played a role in forced labor.

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References:

1. Theory and Practice of the Exportation of Surplus Xinjiang Rural Labor 《新疆农村富余劳动力外出务工理论与实践》, 2018

2. Research on South Xinjiang’s Industry Restructuring and Labor Transfer《新疆南疆产业结构调整与劳动力转移就业问题研究》，2022

3. Research of West China’s Rural Labor Transfer《中国西部农村劳动力转移研究》,2008

4. Empirical Study of Macro Allocation of Xinjiang Labor Force《新疆劳动力资源宏观配置效率的实证研究——给予农业劳动力有限供给视角》, 2016

5. Research on Rural Labor Transfer in Ningxia《宁夏农村劳动力转移研究》,1989

6. “Forced Labor” or “The Pursuit of Happiness“?——An Investigation of Xinjiang Workers in the East《“强迫劳动“还是“追求美好生活”？——新疆工人内地务工情况调查》， 2021

7. A Study of the Surplus Labors Transferring in Kuiya Village of Moyu County in Xinjiang 《新疆和田地区墨玉县奎雅乡维吾尔族农村富余劳动力转移问题探析》，2013

Green is the distinctive color of China-EU cooperation

signifying that climate and environmental cooperation between the two sides is of great importance.

The report takes a look at the accomplishments of the cooperation as well as the challenges, maintaining that there is still great potential for both sides to continue promoting their relationship.

I Accomplishments

i. Establishing Multi-layered partnerships

Led by climate diplomacy between the heads of state and government and guided by intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms, China and the EU have established multilevel, multi-platform, and multilateral communication channels, including cooperation at regional and local levels and cooperation between think tanks, businesses, and other organizations.

Government level

• China and the EU launched the Low Carbon Cities Partnership.

• The China-France Carbon Neutrality Center (CNC) was officially inaugurated in November 2023, the first CNC between China and the EU.

• China has conducted practical cooperation with Germany, France, Italy, and other EU member states.

  China and Germany set up a joint environment and climate change working group, implemented the International Climate Initiative (IKI), and carried out dozens of projects in such fields as climate partnership, NDCs, carbon market, low-carbon transport, and climate-smart development.

  China and France launched a joint working group on green and low-carbon economies.

  China and Italy have cooperated on several projects in the fields of climate change adaptation, provincial-level response to climate change, and carbon capture and storage. Between 2012 and 2019, Italy supported China in organizing annual training courses on climate change and sustainable development.

Think tank level

• The EU has been involved in the work of the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) since its second phase in 1997 and sent high-level representatives to serve as members of the CCICED.

• Continued efforts were made to facilitate the Sino-German Track II Dialogue (T2D) on Climate Change and Sustainable Development and promote academic exchanges between Chinese and German climate experts.

• The China-EU Environmental Policy Research Center was established in 2021 as a broader platform for communication and cooperation among think tanks.

Industry level

• The European Union Chamber of Commerce in China and the China Chamber of Commerce to the EU were established in 2000 and 2019, respectively, and eight China-EU ecological parks have been built in China.

• The China-EU Green Economic Cooperation and Development Summit was held in 2021, and Chinese and EU enterprises launched the Green Action Initiative, strengthening their climate exchanges and cooperation.

• Since 2016, China and Germany have collaborated on the demonstration project “Energy Saving in the EnergyIntensive Industry through Energy Diagnosis.”

ii Fruitful results

Carbon markets

China and the EU have maintained close communication and cooperation on the construction of carbon markets. The two sides established a mechanism of regular dialogues on carbon markets, signed the memorandum of understanding on emissions trading cooperation, and strengthened research and capacity building in carbon quota allocation, carbon market pilots and transition, information disclosure, and other fields.

Climate investment and financing

China and the EU conduct practical cooperation on climate investment and financing, leading the way in sustainable finance. The International Platform on Sustainable Finance (IPSF) was jointly launched, which released the “Common Ground Taxonomy-Climate Change Mitigation” (the CGT) to promote the alignment of green finance taxonomies, improve the comparability and interoperability of China and EU taxonomies, and guide cross-border flows of green capital.

Industrial transition cooperation

• In December 2023, the first China-EU Partnership Dialogue was held, and ten typical cases of China-EU cooperation on green and low-carbon development were selected and released for the occasion. The cases involved Germany, France, Malta, Finland, and Switzerland, among others, and covered a wide range of areas such as green energy transition, energy conservation, carbon reduction and efficiency, green and low carbon science and technology innovation, and the development of circular economy.

• Under the Sino-German Energy Partnership Framework, the Sino-German Demonstration Project on Energy Efficiency in City Quarters was implemented, and comprehensive mid-to-long-term energy efficiency enhancement plans have been formulated.

Cooperation in climate change adaptation

• China, the Netherlands, and other countries jointly launched the Global Commission on Adaptation (GCA), and the first regional office of the GCA—the China Office—was established in 2019.

• EU organized the Strategic Dialogue on Climate Change Adaptation, the EU-China Online Workshop on Urban Adaptation to Climate Change, the China-EU Expert Dialogue on Climate Risk, Impact and Adaptation, and other high-level events.

II Challenges

China and the EU have motivations to enhance their cooperation on environment and climate, and at the same time face forces that impede their cooperation. Challenges such as geopolitical issues and the sluggish global economy have introduced many uncertainties to China-EU cooperation.

• There are strategic divergences at the policy level. The EU is changing its strategic stance toward China, viewing China as a “cooperation partner, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival”. It emphasizes the need to manage risks and reduce dependency and has launched a series of regulations and policies to promote the localization of European industries.

• The EU prioritizes the independence of its industrial and supply chains, establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism, initiating anti-subsidy investigations against Chinese electric vehicles using foreign subsidies regulation, and reviewing European investments in China.

Full text to the report in English:

https://f2.xhinst.net/group2/M00/00/82/CgoMnmY1XI6AOPf5AA__fgBgAas113.pdf

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The visit is said to be the first by a THU team since the end of the COVID-19 pandemic, and given that these are some of China’s brightest students, Beijing Channel took the opportunity to interview the students after their return, to discover that they experienced, observed and felt.

【1】A unpleasant entry

The students hit their first snag going through the customs at Boston airport. Despite presenting valid credentials, 5 of the 14 students were questioned for multiple hours.

Two customs officers jointly questioned Sam, a quantum information major student. He said the first question he was asked was “Why are you not a CPC member?”A question that he did not see coming. Other students were asked similar questions on party affiliation.

"It seems in their eyes all Chinese are CPC members," another student added.

According to Sam, he told the customs officer that each Chinese person can choose whether to join the CPC.

“You are lying. How can you represent Tsinghua if you are not a CPC member?” Sam recounted the response from the U.S. officer.

“Isn’t that the meaning of representation? That we would have both party members and non-party members?” Sam said.

Sam said in hours of interrogation he was accused of lying multiple times, and the U.S. officers seemed to hold a guilty-until-proven-innocent mentality.

“According to their logic, because I study physics and physics is an advanced discipline, it must serve the Chinese military, and therefore I must be associated with the Chinese military, and that everything I said must be lies,” Sam said.

According to the students, another logic that the U.S. officers seemed to hold was that because the group’s itinerary included meeting with the U.S. think tanks and some of the think tanks had close relationships with the U.S. government, the students are suspected of being after U.S. government secrets.

Some of the students were also asked why they looked nervous, and the students answered, that if you are held up by a police officer without committing any wrongdoing, you’d think something’s wrong too.

According to the students, toward the end of the questioning, one of the U.S. officers warned the students “Don’t think that you are so skilled in answering questions, we are proceeding professionally, you need to watch yourself while in the United States.”

【2】A pot-flavored apple

At the gate of Harvard University, many students noticed a nasty stench. The team’s leader told the students it was the smell of marijuana. The students said, that when they arrived in New York City, the entire city was steeped in the smell.

Anna, who is from Tsinghua’s School of Sociology, said she’s been to the United States multiple times before. The most striking impression for her was the feeling that the U.S. society is “decaying”.

Aside from the stench of marijuana, Downtown NYC is dirty, disorderly, and rundown. Anna said she noticed many more homeless people on the streets of NYC this time around, there are even homeless people in Times Square, and police presence is also much more visible this time.

“The most exaggerated scene I saw was a NYPD officer armed with three guns,” Anna said.

“The skyline of New York is still breathtaking, and the unemployment numbers given by the Labor Department are still rosy, but they felt detached from reality,” Anna said.

【3】A position of strength

At the Stimson Center, the students met with three U.S. State Department officials led by Erik Black.

The students noted that the U.S. diplomats were very well prepared for their meeting, each of them bringing a heavy binder filled with talking points on hot-button issues ranging from Taiwan, the China-India border dispute, the South China Sea, and trade.

The students found the U.S. position on Taiwan most unacceptable. Black was quoted by the students as saying that the United States pays close attention to Taiwan, and maintains that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act and the U.S. One-China Policy. Black further stated that Washington believes that there’s a risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait and that the United States is “protecting Taiwan”. The students said Black says the United States supports a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question but shied away from talking about a peaceful reunification of Taiwan.

The students described the U.S. position as “arrogant”, and Cathy of the School of Business Management said the discussion gave her the feeling that Washington considered Taiwan an independent political entity.

【4】Doves in the eagle’s nest

During their visit, the students were happy to find friendly faces, who called for stabilizing the China-U.S. relationship.

At Harvard University, the students were warmly received by vice-provost Mark C. Elliot. Elliot, a seasoned China scholar, told the students that he hoped the students could feel welcomed at Harvard. “Regardless of the relationship between governments, we still very much welcome people-to-people and school-to-school communication, we believe that exchanges between students and schools should not be interrupted by official relationship.”

At George Washington University, the students met with Robert Sutter and a group of GWU students. Sutter was straightforward in saying that bilateral ties are in “free fall”, and the prospect of cooperation in any field looked “dim”, but some of the GWU students offered different takes based on their own experience.

One American student said he was interning at a tech company and felt that there’s a high degree of cooperation between Chinese and U.S. academia on AI. “I hope this cooperation could continue,” the student said.

Another American student added that looking at history, even during the height of the Cold War, the U.S. and USSR scientists cooperated through third parties.

A third American student said he wanted to clarify that the folks on the hill “don’t represent us, especially the young because they are so old.”

【5】Things to learn

During their trip, the students observed aspects of the U.S. society that China should learn from.

Zoe, a student from the School of Architecture, said there are many details in the U.S. urban design that are more advanced.

For example, pedestrian signal lights are shaped as a hand and a walking figure, to help the color blind determine the signal. Almost all buildings have accessible designs for the disabled. Road design at intersections is friendly for cars, bikes, and pedestrians, and water fountains found everywhere are very convenient.

Zoe said before coming to the United States she thought infrastructure was one of China’s strengths, but the trip educated her on how to optimize the infrastructure to serve all members of the society.

Other students made similar observations. They said it’s more often to see people with crutches or on wheelchairs. “we don’t see them as often in China because it’s more inconvenient for them to move around.”

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The interview is conducted and organized by MA Xiao, and translated into English by Beijing Channel. The views expressed here do not necessarily represent those of Tsinghua University, Xinhua News Agency, or this newsletter.

December 26, 2023, marks the 15th anniversary since the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), under authorization from the UN, embarked on the first escort mission in the Gulf of Aden.

Since then, the PLAN has sent over 150 warships and 35000 troops on 45 missions to keep peace in the turbulent waters. According to an official tally, PLAN escorted more than 1600 groups of vessels, totaling more than 7200. Over half of the escorted vessels are non-Chinese.

亚丁湾、索马里海域护航任务成为人民海军成立以来，在海外维护国家战略利益、履行大国责任义务，常态部署时间最长、运用兵力最多、活动范围最广的重大军事实践。

The escort mission in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters has become a major military practice since PLAN’s founding to safeguard the strategic interests of the country and fulfill the responsibilities and obligations of a great power overseas, with the longest time of continued deployment, the largest number of troops utilized and the widest scope of activities.

Based on public information, Beijing Channel has created a chart that documents all 45 missions, including information on each mission, participating warships, and their respective achievements.

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That’s a lot of information to be squeezed into one chart, and I’ve likely made a mistake somewhere, so if you spot an error please reach out to me and I’ll correct it.

Source of information:

https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/8LeUDHZakv3jsT-ePMT-DQ

Wikipedia

http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jsxd/16276226.html

http://www.news.cn/20231226/12e1b06ac066436d81a36babe62303fe/c.html

Not sourced in this newsletter but containing more cool photos of the missions:

https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/YaxyPDJZfB3wqIGauff7kw

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Beijing Channel interns Ye Rujing and Lin Yaxin contributed to this report.

Below are the main points of the expert. What’s said does not necessarily reflect the views of the Chinese government, Xinhua, or this newsletter.

1. The CEWC readout did not offer as strong a stimulus as the market had expected, or wanted, but that is a purposeful response. It is the view of policymakers that the Chinese economy is facing systemic shifts and needs deep reforms, therefore maintaining austere-leaning policy would help facilitate the reforms, as various economic departments would feel more pressured to cooperate with reform demands. If the central government goes on a spending spree, while feasible, it will only allow different players to become complacent and fall back to their old ways. Furthermore, the central government fears that injecting too much easy money into regional governments or companies may run the risk of being viewed as rewarding irresponsible behavior and setting a bad example for others. The bailout of several major U.S. investment banks after the 2008 market crash is something Beijing does not want to repeat.

2. The measured response also shows that Beijing is not particularly worried about the status quo of the economy or feels pressured to roll out more dramatic policies for the market.

3. There’s an expectation that the external environment will worsen for China down the road, which may put further strain on the Chinese economy, so it’s better to reserve some policies for down the road.

4. About peak China, an idea that has significantly influenced if not dominated the Western discourse on China, the expert says it is nothing more than a fusion of “China collapse theory” and “China threat theory”. Part of the "Peak China" theory advocates argue that China will be posing a bigger threat to the world as its economy faces stagnation because it will seek to divert its domestic troubles overseas. However, the expert says Beijing is focused on solving China’s problems at home and is not seeking to export conflict to ease domestic pressure. MIT’s M. Taylor Fravel made a similar argument in a Sept. piece in the Foreign Affairs.

5. About “establish the new before abolishing the old” (先立后破), Beijing has realized that some of the policies to limit conventional industries came down too fast and tough, and in the future would better balance between fostering new industries and limiting conventional industries. But industries such as the real estate sector should be clear-eyed that the central government still aims to moderate its role in the economy, and it’s unlikely that they return to the good old days. It’s true that due to hardships in the real estate sector in the past year, the government supported more loans for real estate companies to get by, but the loans are given to allow the companies to finish and deliver projects, not to spur big expansions.

6. Regarding balancing security and growth, some outside analysts may have underestimated the risk China is facing, leading to them being unable to understand why China has devoted so much resource to shoring up security.

7. About strengthening the consistency of macroeconomic policy orientation (增强宏观政策取向一致性), it’s a continuation of policies installed during Covid that evaluates whether government policies, either economic or non-economic (such as the tutoring ban and environmental protection inspections) conform with the priority of the central government. Beijing realized in H2 2021 that well-intended policies may cumulate and yield unintended consequences. Han Wenxiu, a senior official of the Central Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs, warned of the “fallacy of composition” in an interview.

To avoid recreating the scenario, in practice government agencies now need to internally evaluate regulatory documents (规范性文件), and then submit them to the NDRC for a final review.

*Note: There is public information to support this. In August the NDRC held a joint press conference and in answering the last question, the NDRC official said

为此，发展改革委将会同有关方面，紧紧围绕高质量发展这个首要任务和构建新发展格局这个战略任务，坚持问题导向、强化统筹协调，打好宏观政策组合拳，重点做好三个“加强”。

……

二是加强与宏观政策取向一致性评估。在各部门制发政策文件前，对政策文件内容和出台时机等开展与宏观政策取向一致性评估，推动各部门强化政策协调和工作协同，密切配合、同向发力、形成合力，防止出现“合成谬误”问题，维护好稳定可预期的宏观政策环境。

To this end, the Development and Reform Commission will work with the relevant parties, carefuly implement the primary task of high-quality development and the construction of a new development pattern of this strategic task, adhering to the problem-oriented, strengthened coordination, and create an effective combination of macro-policy. Our work will have three focuses.

......

The second is to strengthen the assessment of consistency with macro policy orientation. Prior to the issuance of policy documents by various ministries, assess the consistency of the content of regulatory documents and the timing of their issuance with macroeconomic policy orientation to promote the strengthening of policy coordination and synergy of work among various ministries, so as to prevent the problem of "fallacy of composition" by closely coordinating and exerting the same force in the same direction, and to maintain a stable and predictable macroeconomic policy environment.

8. About why it’s taking too long for policies rolled out by Beijing to land. Reform is difficult and requires great will and skill to implement. Local governments stick to their old ways for various reasons, it could be because they dismiss certain policies as impractical, it’s politically safer to not implement changes, because of political inertia, or they feel a new policy is not in their interest.

9. On businesses leaving China. Some industries leaving China is a natural process, what we need to keep an eye out for is if key parts of supply chains are leaving the country. So far that is not observed but it happens it should be cause for more alarm.

The author of this essay is Hu Bo, Research Professor and Director of the Center for Maritime Strategy Studies, Peking University, and Director of the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative. 

Full text below.

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Recently, the U.S. DoD "declassified" some of the videos and pictures of aerial encounters with PLA military aircraft in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, accusing China of "risky intercept" and "unprofessional behaviors."

This is, of course, a one-sided narrative from the United States. The Pentagon has not made it clear where these air encounters took place or why they occurred. As the China-U.S. military competition intensifies, the frequency and intensity of air and sea encounters are increasing, and the risk of possible friction and conflict does exist.

However, the United States is hyping "anxiety", partly because of real concerns about risks, and partly because it wants to take hold of the “moral high ground” in international public opinion and diplomacy.

In fact, in the waters surrounding China, such as the East China Sea and the South China Sea, despite the growing competition between the China-U.S. militaries as well as air and sea encounters, it is important to emphasize that the vast majority of the air and sea encounters between the China-U.S. militaries, which occur more than a dozen times a day and thousands of times a year, have been conducted in a safe and professional manner.

For example, in a 2022 emailed statement about transit through the Taiwan Strait, US 7th Fleet spokesperson Mark Langford said in an emailed statement that "all interactions with foreign military forces during the transit were consistent with international standards and practices and did not impact the operation."

In August 2022, Capt. Amy Bauernschmidt told the press after the USS Abraham Lincoln, which she commanded, finished a deployment in the Pacific that “We were operating in the vicinity [of] Chinese warships at times, mostly … that shadowed our ship……It was safe and professional the entire time that we interacted with them. During some flight operations, our aircraft did interact with some of their aircraft, but again it remained safe and professional each and every time we interacted with them.” [1]

Both the U.S. and Chinese militaries have made it clear at the highest levels that they "do not want war" and want to avoid direct military conflict.

While formal communication mechanisms between the two militaries (e.g., the China-U.S. Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings, Defense Policy Coordination Talk, and China-U.S. Theater Commanders Talk) were interrupted after Nancy Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan, there are other channels of communication between frontline commanders, such as the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGs), and the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which was adopted in 2014.

High-level exchanges between the U.S. and Chinese militaries have also been slowly restarting since President Xi Jinping had a meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden in Bali. Overall, the situation of China-U.S. air and sea encounters is not as dire as portrayed by the media and some scholars.

▲ Four scenarios for confrontational encounters between China and the United States

However, under certain circumstances, the risk of conflict could run high. When the United States and China talk about military frictions or dangerous encounters and blame each other, the first thing we should be clear about is where these frictions or encounters are taking place. For both sides, air and sea encounters in different areas have different legal and political implications. Most confrontational encounters between China and U.S. military forces occur under the following four scenarios.

1.    When U.S. forces approach the territorial waters and airspace of mainland China or Hainan Island, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) reacts vigorously, taking such actions as interception or forcing out.

2.    U.S. forces enter the territorial waters and airspace of the Xisha Islands to carry out so-called FONOPs and are warned and driven away by the PLA.

3.   When the U.S. military conducted FONOPs within 12 nautical miles of China-controlled islands and reefs in the Nansha Islands and Huangyan Island, The PLA warned and drove away the U.S. military. For example, on September 30, 2018, the USS Decatur conducted a so-called FONOP in the waters near Nansha Islands' Nanxun Reef and had a close encounter with a Chinese warship. The two ships were only 40 meters apart at their closest.

4.    Both China and the United States engage in close reconnaissance of each other's military forces during military exercises, including live ammunition exercises. While mutual tracking and surveillance of military activities are common, the reconnaissance operations conducted by the U.S. military sometimes come dangerously close.

Particularly during the PLA’s live ammunition exercises, the U.S. military often disregards the no-entry notices and unlawfully enters the relevant sea and airspace. For example, in August 2020, a U.S. U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft intruded into the PLA’s Northern Theater Command's live ammunition exercise airspace, and an accident was barely avoided.

▲ China has legitimate concerns about the close encounters between Chinese and U.S. naval and air forces

While China is dissatisfied with the U.S. military's actions in the waters near China and believes that the root cause of the encounters at sea and in the air is the aggressively close reconnaissance and other targeted military operations conducted by the U.S. military, it nevertheless tracks and monitors the U.S. military in accordance with international conventions, which is no different from reciprocal reactions of U.S. and Japan for China.

China only reacts more strongly in the four above-mentioned types of military encounters, which is in line with international common sense. Any country would take all feasible measures to safeguard its territorial, sovereign, and platform security against any actions that attempt to approach its territorial waters and airspace or pose a threat to its training exercises.

Strategically, China opposes the continuous challenges posed by the U.S. to China's sovereignty over islands and reefs and its national security. Technically or in specific actions, China opposes actions by the U.S. that endanger the safety of personnel onshore at sea and in the air. In addition to strategic and legal differences, China also has three legitimate concerns:

First, some of the U.S. military's reconnaissance missions are too close to China and overly provocative.

For example, on September 4, 2021, a U.S. RC-135S Cobra Ball missile surveillance aircraft approached Jiaozhou Bay in Shandong Province for close reconnaissance, with its closest point of approach to the Chinese territorial baseline being less than 20 nautical miles. On December 8, 2022, a U.S. P-8A anti-submarine patrol aircraft flew over the Taiwan Strait, at times with a distance of less than 13 nautical miles from the Chinese territorial baseline.

Second, China has reasons to be concerned about frequent accidents involving the U.S. military. In recent years, the high frequency of U.S. military operations and the negative impact on training and proficiency have led to numerous unfortunate accidents (such as the collision incident involving the U.S. Navy's USS Fitzgerald missile destroyer in 2017).

When the Chinese and American militaries come into close proximity, the possibility of accidental incidents occurring due to a decline in the professionalism of the U.S. military is increasing.

Third, the United States has intensified the public hype and politicization of encounters at sea and in the air and military actions. In recent years, the United States has amplified the political and diplomatic implications of its military actions, with the most iconic examples being the so-called FONOPs carried out by the U.S. military within 12 nautical miles of China-controlled islands in the South China Sea and its transits through the Taiwan Strait.

On October 27, 2015, the U.S. destroyer USS Lassen conducted a highly publicized FONOP in the waters near the Nansha Islands. Although the U.S. had previously conducted such activities in the South China Sea, they were rarely so open and high-profile. The same is true for U.S. transits through the Taiwan Strait. Since 2018, after each transit through the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. Navy would either feed information to the media or directly issue announcements, claiming to "maintain freedom and openness in the Indo-Pacific region". Such hype and politicization have increased the complexity and difficulty of military communication between China and the U.S. and added to the risks of encounters between Chinese and American naval and aerial forces.

[1]Note: the original essay wrongly attributed the above quote to Rear Adm. J.T. Anderson, this newsletter corrected the inaccuracy.

The views expressed in this essay do not necessarily reflect those of this newsletter or Xinhua News Agency.

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